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Problems associated with poverty are not new to American
cities. Nevertheless, in recent years a consensus has developed that
increasing concentrations of very poor, predominantly minority
households in inner-city communities have generated especially
severe social pathologies ranging from persistent unemployment
and welfare dependency to crime and drug abuse. Patterns of
geographically concentrated inner-city poverty are rooted in a
number of demographic and social dynamics including urban
deindustrialization, the breakdown of the nuclear family, race
discrimination, and the adverse impacts of government policies. In
this Article, we examine one surprisingly important and under-
examined cause of concentrated inner-city poverty-federal housing
law and policy. Throughout the twentieth century, federal housing
law and policy have exhibited a locational bias that has promoted
the growth of large concentrations of poor people in the inner city.
In Part I, we briefly describe the increase in concentrated
poverty that has taken place in American cities over the past two
decades as well as the problems it generates. In Part II, we examine
how federal housing policies of the past sixty years have contributed
to concentrated inner-city poverty. Particular emphasis is placed
upon the federal Public Housing Program. In addition to describ-
ing how public housing promoted concentrated poverty within its
walls, we examine whether the program negatively affected urban
neighborhoods. We use data from the city of Philadelphia to test
whether the location of public housing in a neighborhood affects
overall poverty rates within that community. Our findings suggest
that the existence of public housing in a neighborhood contributes
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substantially to concentrated inner-city poverty. Part II also shows
how federal mortgage assistance programs may have destabilized
inner-city neighborhoods by redlining areas with significant
proportions of minority households. Efforts by the federal
government in the late 1960s to remedy the negative effects of these
programs paradoxically led to increased levels of abandonment and
deterioration in many of these same neighborhoods.
The locational biases of federal housing policy are not merely
matters of history. Part III describes how current housing programs
and laws continue to foster the isolation of low-income families in
inner-city communities. In particular, we use data from the Boston
metropolitan area to examine how the Community Reinvestment
Act, a law designed to increase access to home ownership in low-
income neighborhoods, may actually reinforce concentrated poverty
in American cities. We conclude in Part IV by describing changes
in federal housing subsidy programs and law enforcement that
might promote the objective of deconcentrating the inner-city poor.
I. THE GROWTH OF CONCENTRATED INNER-CITY POVERTY
Since the mid-1980s, social scientists have conducted extensive
research on the geography of poverty in American cities. Typically,
these studies use census tracts as convenient proxies for neighbor-
hoods and characterize particular threshold levels of households
earning incomes below the poverty level as "extreme poverty" or
"underclass" areas. For example, PaulJargowsky and MaryJo Bane
report that from 1970 to 1980, the number of poor people living in
tracts with 40% or more of their populations composed of poor
people increased by 29.5% to 2,449,324.'
Despite the economic boom of the 1980s, data from the 1990
Census of Population and Housing demonstrate that concentrated
inner-city poverty continued to grow over the past decade. In a
recent article, Kasarda presents census data for several different
neighborhood classification types. Among these neighborhoods are
"extreme poverty" tracts in which 40% of the residents are impover-
ished and "distressed" neighborhoods in which the proportion of
' See Paul A. Jargowsky & Mary Jo Bane, Ghetto Poverty in the United States, 1970-
1980, in THE URBAN UNDERCLASS 235, 252 (Christopher Jencks & Paul E. Peterson
eds., 1991); see also Richard P. Nathan & Charles F. Adams, Jr., Four Perspectives on
Urban Hardship, 104 POL. SCI. Q. 483, 503 (1989); John C. Weicher, How Poverty
Neighborhoods Are Changing, in INNER-CITY POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 68, 70
(Laurence E. Lynn, Jr. & Michael G.H. McGeary eds., 1990).
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residents who are simultaneously below the poverty line, unem-
ployed, living in female-headed households and receiving public
assistance falls at least one or more standard deviations above the
average for all tracts in 1980.2
As Tables I and II demonstrate, the number of people living in
each of these two types of neighborhoods rose between 1980 and
1990. For extreme poverty tracts, the population actually increased
at a faster rate during the 1980s than it had during the 1970s.
These data also indicate that concentrated poverty increased its
spatial reach over the period from 1980 to 1990, affecting a growing
number of census tracts.
TABLE I
EXTREME POVERTY TRACTS FOR LARGEST 100 CITIES (1970-1990)3
(Unless otherwise specified, numbers are percentages.)
[ CHARACTERISTIC 1970 1980 1990
Number of Tracts 751 1331 1954
Tracts as Percentage of All Tracts
in Cities 6.0 9.7 13.7
Population (in 1000s) 2691 3833 5496
Population as Percentage of
Cities' Population 5.2 7.9 10.7
Proportion of Population Non-
Hispanic White 18.6 14.6 15.5
Proportion of Population Non-
Hispanic Black 64.8 64.4 57.3
Proportion of Population Hispanic 15.2 19.3 23.8
Proportion of Persons Aged 16-19 Who Are
High School Dropouts 24.2 21.9 19.4
Proportion of Households Receiving
Public Assistance 28.1 36.4 32.8
Proportion of Men Not Working During
Previous Year 30.9 42.8 40.4
2John D. Kasarda, Inner-City Concentrated Poverty and Neighborhood Distress: 1970
to 1990, 4 HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 253, 256 (1993).
3 See id. at 258, 263, 271-75.
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TABLE II
DISTRESSED TRACTS FOR LARGEST 100 CaIEs (1970-1990)
4
(Unless otherwise specified, numbers are percentages.)
CHARACTERISTIC 1970 1980 1990
Number of Tracts 296 1513 1850
Tracts as Percentage of All Tracts
in Cities 2.4 11.0 13.0
Population (in 1000s) 1022 4893 5704
Population as Percentage of
Cities' Population 1.7 10.0 11.1
Proportion of Population Non-Hispanic
White 14.8 10.1 10.4
Proportion of Population Non-Hispanic
Black 76.6 72.4 67.7
Proportion of Population Hispanic 7.1 16.2 19.6
Proportion of Persons Aged 16-19 Who
Are High School Dropouts 26.7 23.1 21.4
Proportion of Households Receiving
Public Assistance 36.2 36.4 34.6
Important regional differences exist in the growth rates of
concentrated inner-city poverty between 1980 and 1990. Both the
population living in these neighborhoods as well as the aggregate
number of neighborhoods rose in the Midwest and the South, but
decreased in the Northeast.' Cities with the largest increase in
populations living in extreme poverty tracts were Detroit, Los
Angeles, Houston, Milwaukee, and Fresno.6 Cities that experienced
the greatest declines in the number of residents in these neighbor-
hoods were Newark, New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and
4 See id. at 258, 263, 274-75.
' See id. at 258-62. The number of extreme poverty tracts and distressed neigh-
borhoods slightly increased in the West from 1980 to 1990, but the number of severe-
ly distressed tracts fell. See id. at 262. Note, however, that the numbers of poverty,
extreme poverty, distressed, and severely distressed tracts grew in all four regions
between 1970 and 1980. See id. at 259-60.
6 See id. at 295.
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Jacksonville.' In both extreme poverty and distressed tracts, the
overwhelming majority of residents in 1990 were racial minorities.
8
Nevertheless, from 1980 to 1990, the proportion composed of
Hispanics and non-Hispanic whites increased slightly.
9
Concentrated inner-city poverty generates problems that are
different both in kind and in magnitude from those experienced by
poor people in other geographic settings. WilliamJulius Wilson, in
his 1987 book The Truly Disadvantaged,"0 argues that the geograph-
ic isolation of poor people generates behavioral adaptations called
"concentration effects."1 1 Specifically, children growing up in
neighborhoods with few employed role models develop weak
attachments to the labor force. 2 Lacking employment opportuni-
ties and the appropriate socialization to seek work, youths frequent-
ly engage in deviant or illegal activities to earn income and gain
status, thereby further distancing themselves from middle-class
norms. 3 These behaviors are reinforced by peer groups. Activi-
ties that are likely to assist them in obtaining employment and social
mobility, such as graduating from high school, are stigmatized
rather than valued.14
7 See id. at 299.
s In 1990, "blacks made up 57.3 percent of the population in extreme poverty
tracts, Hispanics made up 23.8 percent, and non-Hispanic Whites 15.5 percent." Id.
at 264.
9 See id. at 264-65 ("[N]on-Hispanic whites marginally increased their proportions
between 1980 and 1990 in both extreme poverty and distressed tracts .... The pro-
portions of blacks declined, largely because of substantial increases in the absolute
number of Hispanics in extreme poverty and distressed tracts.").
'0 WILLIAM J. WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE
UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1987).
"Id. at 58 (stating that the term "concentration effects" "capture[s] the
differences in the experiences of low-income families who live in inner-city areas from
... those who live in other areas in the central city today").
12 See id. at 56-57 (explaining that when poor youths live in economically diverse
communities, a "social buffer" exists because by observing education, steady employ-
ment, and family stability, they grow to understand that there are social norms).
"s See id. at 57-58; see also WilliamJ. Wilson, Studying Inner-City Social Dislocations:
The Challenge of Public Agenda Research, 56 AM. SOc. REV. 1, 12 (1991) ("The issue is
not simply that the underclass or ghetto poor have a marginal position in the labor
market ... it is also that their economic position is uniquely reinforced by their social
milieu.").
" Douglas Massey and Nancy Denton suggest that youths living in concentrated
poverty neighborhoods adopt "oppositional cultures" to protect their self esteem and
engender the respect of peers. Among the elements of this culture most harmful to
their future employment prospects is the devaluation of academic success as "acting
white." See DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID:
SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 167-76 (1993).
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Wilson's concentration effects hypothesis has received almost
universal empirical confirmation. Although the precise causal
mechanism remains a matter of debate, studies testing the theory
demonstrate a consistent relationship between social and spatial
isolation on the one hand, and high rates of teenage childbearing,
school dropouts, and welfare dependency on the other. 15
II. THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN PAST FEDERAL HOUSING POLICIES
AND THE GROWTH OF CONCENTRATED
INNER-CITY POVERTY
Federal housing policy has historically played an important,
albeit nonexclusive, I6 role in the creation of urban ghettos. This
locational bias is exhibited in interventions to assist both renters
and home owners. In this Part, we examine how the public housing
program and homeowner mortgage assistance programs have contri-
buted to the concentration of poverty in the inner city.
15 See REBECCA L. CLARK, NEIGHBORHOOD EFFECTS ON DROPPING OUT OF SCHOOL
AMONG TEENAGE Boys 16-21 (Urban Inst. Discussion Paper No. PSC-DSC-UI-13,
1992) (reporting that the rate of school dropouts among boys increases both as the
proportion of poor households in a community increases and as the proportion of
households employed in middle-class occupations declines, although the results do
not support a contagion theory); Elijah Anderson, Neighborhood Effects on Teenage
Pregnancy, in THE URBAN UNDERCLASS, supra note 1, at 375, 382-97 (describing
cultural explanations for teenage pregnancy in ghetto communities);Jeanne Brooks-
Gunn et al., Do Neighborhoods Influence Child and Adolescent Development?, 99 AM. J.
Soc. 353, 384-85 (1993) (concluding that the presence of affluent neighbors decreases
the likelihood that teenagers will have children and drop out of school); Jonathan
Crane, The Epidemic Theoy of Ghettos and Neighborhood Effects on Dropping out and
Teenage Childbearing, 96 AM. J. SoC. 1226, 1236 (1991) (demonstrating that as the
proportion of high-status jobholders in a community declines, the rate of school
dropouts increases exponentially, thereby supporting the contagion model); Paul
Osterman, Welfare Participation in a Full Employment Economy: The Impact of
Neighborhood, 38 SOC. PROB. 475, 486-88 (1991) (stating that as the proportion of
employed persons in a community decreases, the likelihood that an individual
resident will receive public assistance increases).
16 For discussions of other forces that have contributed to create or exacerbate
concentrated inner-city poverty, see generally MYRON MAGNET, THE DREAM AND THE
NIGHTMARE: THE SIXTIES' LEGACY TO THE UNDERCLASS (1993) (describing liberal
cultural norms of the 1960s); MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 14 (discussing economic
restructuring and race discrimination); LAWRENCE M. MEAD, THE NEW POLITICS OF
POVERTY: THE NONWORKING POOR IN AMERICA (1992) (delineating the characterolog-
ical flaws among poor people); CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING GRQUND (1984) (exploring
the role of social welfare programs in exacerbating the problem of inner-city poverty);
WILSON, supra note 10 (observing economic restructuring and out-migration of the
black middle class).
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A. The Public Housing Program
The federal housing program that has generated the most
intense pattern of concentrated poverty is the public housing
program. The modern public housing program traces its roots to
the mid-1930s, when the Public Works Administration purchased
land and built publicly owned housing.1" In 1935, however, a
federal court struck down this program in United States v. Certain
Lands in Louisville."8 The court reasoned that providing housing
to low-salaried workers and residents of slum districts was not a
public purpose and therefore was beyond the scope of the govern-
ment's eminent domain powers.
19
The Louisville case had enormously important implications for
the structure of the public housing program that emerged in the
Housing Act of 1937.20 Instead of being owned by the federal
government, public housing would be owned and operated by local
public housing authorities (PHAs) created by states and localities.
21
Municipalities that wished to participate in the program would
establish a PHA and enter into an Annual Contribution Contract
(ACC) with the federal government. 22 Under the ACC, the federal
government funded the majority of the capital costs of public
housing by paying the debt service on long-term bonds. 23  The
PHA, in turn, agreed to operate the housing over the life of the
bonds, subject to federal statutes and regulations.
17 See ELIZABETH WOOD, THE BEAUTIFUL BEGINNINGS, THE FAILURE TO LEARN:
FIFTY YEARS OF PUBLIC HOUSING IN AMERICA 2-7 (1982).
18 78 F.2d 684 (6th Cir. 1935).
" See id. at 687 (stating that the power of eminent domain does not include "the
construction of sanitary houses to sell or lease to low-salaried workers or residents of
slum districts").
20 Pub. L. No. 75-412, 50 Stat. 888 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437-
1439 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
21 Some state courts had already decided that contrary to Louisville, state
subdivisions had the power to use their own powers of eminent domain to provide
low-cost housing. See, e.g., New York City Hous. Auth. v. Muller, 1 N.E.2d 153, 156
(N.Y. 1936) ("[T]he public is seeking to take the defendant's property and to
administer it as part of a project conceived and to be carried out in its own interest
.... This is... a public use.").
In addition, the municipality in which the public housing was located and the
PHA were required to execute a Cooperation Agreement in which the municipality
exempted the PHA from real property taxes. PHAs did contribute payments in lieu
of property taxes to the municipality. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437c(e)(2) (1988).
2 The typical bond had a term of 40 years. In the mid-1980s, the federal
government gave loans or grants directly to PHAs instead of requiring them to float
bonds. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437c(a)(2) (1988).
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The outbreak of World War II resulted in relatively low levels of
public housing being built under the Housing Act of 1937.24
Following the war, Congress reenacted the program in the Housing
Act of 1949,25 which also established the Urban Renewal slum-
clearance program. Today, there exist 1.4 million units of public
housing in over ten thousand developments. Over 85% of this
housing was built prior to 1979.26
1. Public Housing and Concentrated Inner-City Poverty
Although most public housing developments in the United
States provide decent and safe homes for their residents,27 in many
cities public housing has fostered the concentration of poverty in
inner-city neighborhoods, sometimes single-handedly creating
massive ghettos. 28 This concentration of poverty is rooted in the
structure of the program, federal mandates, the changing demo-
graphics of American cities, local mismanagement, and judicial
rulings. The federal-local structure of the public housing program,
mandated by Congress after the Louisville case, effectively removed
the decision of where to locate public housing from the federal
government and placed it in the hands of local governments.
Rather than public housing being dispersed throughout metropoli-
tan communities, local choice permitted many municipalities,
typically those located in the suburbs, to avoid participating in the
program.
This bias toward locating public housing in central cities was
further strengthened by the inclusion in the Housing Act of 1937 of
what has become known as the "equivalent elimination require-
ment."29 This provision mandated that one unit of substandard
24 From 1937 to 1948, 117,000 units of public housing were built in the United
States. See JAMES R. PRESCOTT, ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF PUBLIC HOUSING 24 (1974).
25 Pub. L. No. 81-171, 63 Stat. 413.
26 See Michael A. Stegman, The Role of Public Housing in a Revitalized National
Housing Policy, in BUILDING FOUNDATIONS: HOUSING AND FEDERAL POLICY 333, 339
(Denise DiPasquale & Langley C. Keyes eds., 1990).27 
See, e.g., NATIONAL COMM'N ON SEVERELY DISTRESSED PUB. HOUS., THE FINAL
REPORT 2 (1992) (stating that 6% of public housing stock is severely distressed);
RONALD JONES ET AL., PROBLEMS AFFECTING Low-RENT PUBLIC HOUSING PROJECTS
2-3 (1979) (stating that 15% of the nation's public housing stock can be characterized
as "troubled").
28 For a more detailed analysis of the relationship between public housing and
concentrated inner-city poverty, see Michael H. Schill, Distressed Public Housing: Where
Do We Go from Here?, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 497, 501-22 (1993).
' Pub. L. No. 75-412, § 10(a), 50 Stat. at 891-92.
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housing be eliminated for each unit of public housing construct-
ed.30 Because most suburbs had little substandard housing, even
those that wished to participate in the public housing program were
sometimes excluded. 1
The concentration of public housing in inner cities contributed
both directly and indirectly to concentrated poverty. Because land
values in cities were usually higher than those for comparable sites
at the periphery, much public housing was built on relatively
expensive land. To economize on land, urban PHAs tended to
build at high densities, often constructing large residential towers.
In addition to forcing public housing tenants to live in close
proximity to each other, these types of projects often generated a
series of problems that led to their abandonment by all but the
poorest and least mobile tenants.
High density apartment buildings are now generally thought to
be inappropriate for poor families with children.32 Elevators break
down as a result of heavy usage and insufficient maintenance. In
addition, parents find it difficult to monitor the activities of their
children when recreation spaces are located at a distance from their
apartments. Furthermore, the large volume of residents fosters
anonymity, making it difficult for tenants to maintain security and
a sense of community." All of these factors combine to promote
vandalism, which further undermines the quality of life in public
housing.
3 4
After ensuring that most public housing would be built in
central cities, Congress also used statutory admissions requirements
to fill public housing with extremely poor residents. The 1937
" The "equivalent elimination requirement" was enacted at the urging of real
estate interest groups that feared competition from publicly supported housing.
These interest groups also supported income limitations. See infra notes 35-39 and
accompanying text.
-" See WOOD, supra note 17, at 11 (citing a former federal housing commissioner's
testimony that "if there were no slums in the locality, regardless of how acute the
housing shortage was, and if we knew that we could not get the equivalent elimination
required by the Act, we could not go in there").
32 In 1968, Congress prohibited the construction of high-rise developments for
families with children unless no practical alternative exists. See Housing and Urban
Development Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448, § 207, 82 Stat. 476, 504. But seeJ.S.
Fuerst & Roy Petty, High-Rise Housingfor Low-Income Families, 103 PUB. INTEREST 118,
129-30 (1991) (arguing that high-rise housing is not necessarily inappropriate for
families).
ss See OSCAR NEWMAN, DEFENSIBLE SPACE 15-18 (1972) (discussing withdrawal
from urban life as the result of the physical design of buildings within cities).
34 See id.
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Housing Act reflects the ambivalence that members of Congress felt
over who should live in public housing. 5 The Act requires that
the housing be "within the financial reach of families of low
income." 6 "Families of low income" were defined to be those
"who are in the lowest income group and who cannot afford to pay
enough to cause private enterprise ... to build an adequate supply
of decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings for their use."3 7  This
legislative mandate that public housing exist to serve the lowest
income households was belied by the economics of the program,
which required that tenant rents cover most operating costs.3" In
the end, Congress set income limits for public housing indirectly by
requiring that tenants earn no more than five times the rent they
paid.3 9
Income limitations grew more stringent in 1949 with the
requirement that PHAs establish income ceilings and force those
whose incomes exceeded these maximum levels to move out.
40
Furthermore, Congress mandated that PHAs give preference in
admissions to those who were displaced as a result of slum clear-
ance, 41 thereby assuring the influx of very poor households.
Although subsequent statutes permitted PHAs to admit greater
proportions of the working poor,42 this trend was sharply reversed
in 1981 with the congressional mandate that 90% of all occupants
of existing public housing and 95% of the tenants in newly con-
structed units earn very low incomes.4 As of 1994, these mini-
" This ambivalence probably reflected the tension between the desire to help the
'worthy poor" as opposed to families on public assistance, on the one hand, and the
intent that public housing not compete with market-rate housing, on the other.
"6 Pub. L. No. 75-412, § 2(1), 50 Stat. at 888.
s7 § 2(2), 50 Stat. at 888.
" See H.R. Rep. No. 1545, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1937) ("It must be recognized,
however, that as long as any rent is to be charged in a project, the people who will
occupy the dwellings must have some income."); LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, GOVERN-
MENT AND SLUM HOUSING: A CENTURY OF FRUSTRATION 109 (1968) (quoting Senator
Wagner's comment that "obviously this bill cannot provide housing for those who
cannot pay the rent minus the subsidy allowed").
39 See Pub. L. No. 75-412, § 2(1), 50 Stat. at 888.
See Housing Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-171, § 301(8), 63 Stat. 413, 422-23.
41 See § 302, 63 Stat. at 423. Congress also prohibited PHAs from discriminating
against recipients of public assistance. See § 301, 63 Stat. at 423.
42 Indeed, the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-
383, § 201(a), 88 Stat. 633, 660 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(c)(4)(A)(iv)) sought to
"avoid concentrations of low-income and deprived families with serious social
problems" by eliminating income ceilings.
3 See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 323, 95
Stat. 357, 404-05 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1437n (1988)). A very low-
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mum quotas for very low-income households had been slightly
reduced to 75% and 85%, respectively.4 4
Local governments and PHAs have also acted to promote the
concentration and isolation of very poor households in public
housing through their siting policies and management practices. In
the absence of effective federal oversight,4 5 public housing devel-
opments were frequently constructed in the least desirable parts of
town, often those areas predominantly occupied by racial minorities.
For example, in Chicago, local politicians succeeded in obtaining
state legislation giving the City Council the right to reject sites
proposed by the Chicago Housing Authority.4 6 A custom devel-
oped in which individual neighborhoods were permitted to veto the
construction of public housing within their borders.4 7 The conse-
quences of this practice are summarized by Arnold Hirsch:
Of the thirty-three projects approved between 1950 and the mid-
1960s, twenty-five and a "substantial portion" of another were
located in census tracts containing a black population in excess of
75%. Of the remaining seven developments, six were located in
areas undergoing racial transition. By the time the projects were
actually completed, only one of the thirty-three was situated in an
area that was less than 84% black; and all but seven of the
developments, when actually completed, were located in census
tracts that were at least 95% black.
4
1
income household has income below 50% of the area median income. See § 322(a),
95 Stat. at 400 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1437a (1988)).
14 See Cranston-Gonzalez National Affordable Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 101-625,
§ 511, 104 Stat. 4079, 4194 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1437n (Supp. 11 1990 &
Supp. V 1993)).
45 Indeed, in the early years of the program, the federal government instructed
PHAs to follow the "neighborhood composition rule," under which the racial
composition of public housing developments was supposed to mirror their neighbor-
hoods. See Mittie 0. Chandler, Public Housing Desegregation: What Are the Options?,
3 HOUSING POL'y DEBATE 509,518 (1992) (noting this federal mandate in the context
of examining policy and programmatic options for the desegregation of low-income
public housing).
46 See ARNOLD R. HIRSCH, MAKING THE SECOND GHETTO: RACE & HOUSING IN
CHICAGO 1940-1960, at 223 (1983).47 See id. at 240-41.
" Id. at 242-43. A recent study by Massey and Kanaiaupuni found a significant
relationship between the racial composition of Chicago census tracts in 1950 and
whether public housing was constructed in that tract. The greater the proportion of
blacks in the tract in 1950, the more likely that public housing would be located in
that tract by 1970. See Douglas S. Massey & Shawn M. Kanaiaupuni, Public Housing
and the Concentration of Poverty, 74 Soc. SCI. Q. 109, 114-15 (1993) (using statistical
projections to examine the premise that public housing represents an important cause
of poverty concentration in U.S. cities); see also GREGORY D. SQUIRES ET AL., CHICAGO:
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The geographic limitations on public housing imposed by the
political process, together with the city's need to construct a large
volume of replacement housing for households displaced by slum-
clearance activities, led to enormous concentrations of public
housing and low-income households in certain Chicago neighbor-
hoods. Similar, if less dramatic patterns were repeated in many
other large American cities such as Dallas, Miami, and Philadel-
phia.49
Inefficient management and systematic under-maintenance also
contributed to the ghettoization of public housing. The Housing
Act of 1937 made no provision for operating expenses or eventual
renovation of public housing developments. Instead, these expenses
were to be covered by the rents paid by tenants. As the relative
income of public housing tenants fell due to inflation, federal
tenant admission requirements, and the deindustrialization of
central cities, PHAs were hard-pressed to maintain their housing
stocks.5" The Brooke Amendment, passed by Congress in 1969,
brought matters to a head by limiting rents to 25% of tenants'
income."' In the face of financial crises and massive levels of
deferred maintenance, Congress enacted a variety of operating and
modernization subsidies, none of which have been sufficient to
reverse the deterioration of the nation's stock of public housing.
According to a recent report prepared for the National Commission
on Severely Distressed Public Housing, the amount needed to
RACE, CLASS, AND THE RESPONSE TO URBAN DECLINE 102-05 (1987) (describing
political decisions to isolate Chicago public housing). Seegenerally MARTIN MEYERSON
& EDWARD C. BANFIELD, POLITICS, PLANNING AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST: THE CASE
OF PUBLIC HOUSING IN CHICAGO (1955) (describing the controversies over public
housing location in Chicago).
49 See, e.g., Walker v. HUD, 734 F. Supp. 1289, 1293 (N.D. Tex. 1989) ("From its
beginning, the primary purpose of [the Dallas Housing Authority's] public housing
program was to prevent blacks from moving into white areas of this city.");JOHN F.
BAUMAN, PUBLIC HOUSING, RACE, AND RENEWAL: URBAN PLANNING IN PHILADELPHIA
1920-1974, at 169 (1987) ("All of the projects planned and built [in Philadelphia]
from 1956 to 1967 were sited in ghetto or 'transitional' neighborhoods."); Raymond
A. Mohl, Race and Space in the Modem City: Interstate-95 and the Black Community in
Miami, in URBAN POLICY IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 100, 132-33 (Arnold R.
Hirsch & Raymond A. Mohl eds., 1993) (noting that in the 1960s, public housing was
built in already segregated areas of Miami).
50 See RACHEL C. BRATT, REBUILDING A LOW-INCOME HOUSING POLICY 58 (1989)
(noting the problems in the public housing financing formula that surfaced in the
1970s).
" See Housing and Urban Development Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-152, § 213(a),
83 Stat. 379, 389 (1970).
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modernize existing public housing ranges from $14.5 billion to
$29.2 billion.52
Physical deterioration of public housing has also been exacerbat-
ed by the managerial inefficiencies of many PHAs. Poor manage-
ment has frequently been attributable to the absence of incentives
to maximize profits as well as to political patronage and corrup-
tion." Although no systematic evaluations of PHA management
practices exist, individual accounts of mismanagement are plentiful.
Apartments often do not meet local health and safety require-
ments. 4 Further decay results from the frequently lengthy periods
of time it takes many PHAs to complete even relatively simple
repairs.5 Long delays in re-renting vacant apartments and in
evicting tenants engaged in damaging and unlawful practices lead
to vandalism. In some jurisdictions, these management problems
have become so severe that the federal government has placed the
PHAs in receivership.
7
52 See ICF, INC., The Modernization Needs of Severely Distressed Public Housing, in
COMPILATION OF UNEDITED TECHNICAL WORKING DRAFTS PREPARED FOR THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON SEVERELY DISTRESSED PUBLIC HOUSING AS OF JUNE 1,
1993, at 3 (1992) [hereinafter COMPILATION].
" See, e.g., Schill, supra note 28, at 497 (noting the frequent accounts of corrupt
administrators); Michael H. Schill, Privatizing Federal Low Income Housing Assistance:
The Case of Public Housing, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 878, 902-04 (1990) (discussing how
the absence of market discipline and the political process may contribute to the
increased cost of public housing).
54 See, e.g., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF HOUS. AND URBAN DEV.,
PHILADELPHIA HOUSING AUTHORITY MANAGEMENT AND SELECTED DEVELOPMENT
OPERATIONS 3 (1992) (finding that of the 87 public housing units inspected, 86 were
not in good repair); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUBLIC HOUSING: CHICAGO
HOUSING AUTHORITY TAKING STEPS TO ADDRESS LONG-STANDING PROBLEMS 15 (1989)
(finding that 93% of the apartments inspected had "many serious physical problems");
Scott Harper, Auditors Give an "F"for Upkeep: Say City Flunking at Allen Parkway
Village, HOUSTON POST, Dec. 18, 1992, at A27, A31 (reporting that none of the units
inspected at a Houston public housing development met federal standards).
55 See, e.g., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 54, at 13 (reporting that only
about one-half of all reported repair work orders in Philadelphia were completed
within the federally prescribed three-day period); Rene Sanchez, D.C. Council Hears
Dismal Tales of Public Housing Repair Delays, WASH. POST, Mar. 1, 1992, at B8
(describing "the abysmal state of maintenance in [D.C.'s] 57 public housing
complexes").
6 See, e.g., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 54, at 9 (reporting that the
Philadelphia Housing Authority has an overall vacancy rate of 20.5% and that the
average period of vacancy for conventional public housing units in the city is 1563
days); James Lawless, Report Critical of CMHA; Repairs, Spending Come Under Fire,
CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Oct. 4, 1992, at BI (stating that a HUD audit found a 31%
vacancy rate in the Cleveland PHA).
5 See Michael deC. Hinds, Public Housing Ills Lead to Questions About H. U.D., N.Y.
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Physical deterioration of public housing, whether caused by
insufficient federal subsidies or by local mismanagement, exacer-
bates the concentration of poverty within its walls. Households with
sufficient resources move elsewhere, leaving behind an increasingly
impoverished group of tenants. The resulting loss of rent income
only intensifies the difficulties PHAs face in maintaining units for
those left behind.
Federal court rulings granting tenants procedural protections
and HUD regulations implementing these judicial decisions may
also have contributed to the concentration of poverty within public
housing. In the early years of the program, PHAs had enormous
latitude in admission and eviction decisions. 8 This freedom per-
mitted PHAs to screen out "problem" tenants and quickly evict
those who created difficulties. 9 Beginning in the 1960s, however,
federal courts ruled that PHAs must adopt "ascertainable standards"
to guide their admissions process and must accord tenants with a
hearing, access to records, and an opportunity to cross-examine
witnesses prior to eviction. 61 Courts did not limit their review of
PHA procedures to procedural matters; they also ruled that certain
grounds for rejection or eviction, such as illegitimacy and the
existence of criminal records, were inappropriate. 6 '
TIMES, July 20, 1992, at A8 (noting that since 1989, HUD has taken partial or full
control over six PHAs).
' This latitude sometimes led PHAs to abuse their discretion. See Charles A.
Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J.
1245, 1250 (1965). Reich notes that public housing authorities' power to select and
evict tenants
can be exercised in a way that is largely discretionary, based in part upon
officials' intangible impressions from interviews and home visits .... The
standards are generally vague, and there are no clearly articulated methods
of proof. There may be little in the way of procedure to make certain that
the authorities' information is true.
Id.
" See Lawrence M. Friedman, Public Housing and the Poor: An Overview, 54 CAL.
L. REV. 642, 657 (1966) (stating that housing authorities often screen out "undesirable
households" with the aid of social workers).
o See, e.g., Thorpe v. Housing Auth., 393 U.S. 268, 283 (1969) (upholding HUD
regulation requiring that tenants in federally assisted projects be informed of the
reasons for eviction and given the opportunity to make a reply prior to eviction);
Escalera v. New York City Hous. Auth., 425 F.2d 853, 862-63 (2d Cir.) (noting that
due process is required for terminating tenancies on the ground of nondesirability),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 853 (1970); Holmes v. New York City Hous. Auth., 398 F.2d 262,
264-65 (2d Cir. 1968) (noting that due process is required for tenant admission
procedures).
61 See Thomas v. Housing Auth., 282 F. Supp. 575, 581 (E.D. Ark. 1967) (holding
that a housing authority may not exclude on the basis of illegitimacy); NATIONAL
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The resulting loss of PHA freedom to select and evict tenants
has contributed to the concentration of poverty within public
housing. The ability of PHAs to screen out potentially troublesome
tenants has been reduced, as has their power to evict those harmful
to the community.6 2 As a result, the quality of life in some public
housing developments has deteriorated, causing those residents who
possessed sufficient resources to move away and leave behind an
increasingly marginalized population.
Recent data confirm the increasing concentration of poverty in
public housing. The median income of families living in public
housing is extremely low-less than $6500.6 Approximately three-
quarters of all nonelderly families living in public housing have
incomes below the poverty level. 4 Over half of all residents have
not graduated from high school 5 and a similar proportion receives
public assistance.66 Longitudinal data demonstrate the increasing
concentration of poverty in public housing over the past twenty
years. In 1974, just over 1% of all households living in nonelderly
developments earned less than 10% of the area's median income;
this proportion grew to over 19% in 1991.67
In addition to being composed of overwhelmingly poor tenants,
public housing is also extremely racially segregated. Two-thirds of
all nonelderly families are black and nearly one-fifth are His-
Hous. LAW PROJECT, HUD HOUSING PROGRAMS: TENANTS' RIGHTS 2/42 n.484 (2d
ed. 1984) (discussing Tucker v. Norwalk Hous. Auth., Civ. No. B-251 (D. Conn. 1971)
(enjoining policy rejecting applicants with a criminal record)).
62 SeeJ.S. Fuerst & Roy Petty, Due Process-How Much Is Enough?, 79 PUB. INTEREST
96, 100-01 (1985). Contrary to the assertion of Professor Roisman, see Florence W.
Roisman, Intentional Racial Discrimination and Segregation by the Federal Government as
a Principal Cause of Concentrated Poverty: A Response to Schill and Wachter, 143 U. PA.
L. REV. 1351, 1364 n.52 (1995), we do not equate "problem" tenants with very-low-
income tenants. Instead, we state that current federal laws make it difficult to screen
out and evict tenants whose behavior is harmful to the community regardless of their
income.
6 See CONNIE CASEY, CHARACTERISTICS OF HUD-ASSISTED RENTERS AND THEIR
UNITS IN 1989, at 68 (1992) (providing a table showing that the median income of
households in both family and elderly developments is $6571); YVES S. DJOKO &
WAYNE SHERWOOD, REPORT No. 92-3: PUBLIC HOUSING DEMOGRAPHICS, 1992, at 24
(1992) (stating that the median gross income of such families is $5747).
' See CASEY, supra note 63, at 68.
65
See U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. AND URBAN DEV., LITERACY AND EDUCATION NEEDS IN
PUBLIC AND INDIAN HOUSING DEVELOPMENTS THROUGHOUT THE NATION 5 (1992).
' See CASEY, supra note 63, at 68 (finding that 57% of all nonelderly families
receive welfare or supplemental security income).
6
1 See Lawrence J. Vale, Beyond the Problem Projects Paradigm: Defining and
Revitalizing 'Severely Distressed" Public Housing, 4 HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 147, 155
(1993).
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panic.6" Minority public housing tenants are especially likely to earn
extremely low incomes.
69
2. An Empirical Analysis of the Relationship Between
Public Housing and Neighborhood
Poverty Rates
Although concentrations of poverty within public housing have
been well documented, little research has been done to examine the
effect of public housing developments on the surrounding neighbor-
hoods. To the extent that public housing generates negative
externalities, one would expect it to affect property values and the
social composition of the neighborhoods in which it is located. The
few studies that have examined the impact of public housing on
neighboring property values, however, fail to find a negative
effect.
70
Similarly, three studies which examine the effect of public
housing on neighborhood racial or socioeconomic composition
reach somewhat contradictory results. Each of these studies test
multiple regression models with longitudinal census data for one
large city. Ira Goldstein and William Yancey specify two equations
in which the proportions of blacks in Philadelphia census tracts in
1970 and 1980 are regressed over several independent variables,
including their distance from the city center, the number of
industrial jobs within one mile of the tract, the median housing
value in 1934, the proportion of blacks in 1950, and whether the
tracts contain public housing.7 ' The variable representing the exis-
68 See CASEY, supra note 63, at 44; LawrenceJ. Vale, Occupancy Issues in Distressed
Public Housing: An Outline of Impacts on Design, Management and Service Delivery, in
COMPILATION, supra note 52, at 17.
" See Vale, supra note 68, at 9 (stating that 25.6% of black families earn less than
10% of the area's median income, compared to 13.6% of white families).
7 0 See Hugh 0. Nourse, The Effect of Public Housing on Property Values in St. Louis,
39 LAND EcON. 433, 440-41 (1963) (finding that public housing had no effect on
property values for two sites but had a positive effect for one site); William A.
Rabiega et al., The Property Value Impacts of Public Housing Projects in Low and Moderate
Density Residential Neighborhoods, 60 LAND ECON. 174, 178 (1984) (noting that low
density public housing developments have a positive, but small, effect on neighboring
property values).
71 See Ira Goldstein & William L. Yancey, Public Housing Projects, Blacks, and Public
Housing in Philadelphia, in HOUSING DESEGREGATION AND FEDERAL PoLIcY 262-89
(John M. Goering ed., 1986).
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tence of conventional public housing in a tract consistently fails to
reach accepted levels of statistical significance.
72
George Galster and Heather Keeney also examine the effect of
subsidized housing on neighborhood racial change in Yonkers, New
York from 1970 to 1980.7' Their model includes variables measur-
ing the racial composition of census tracts and adjacent tracts, as
well as variables measuring the proportion of the population that is
over the age of sixty-four, college graduates, and homeowners.
Unlike Goldstein and Yancey, Galster and Keeney find a significant
relationship between the number of units of subsidized housing and
increases in the proportion of black residents. Nevertheless, they
report that the magnitude of this relationship is small.74
The third study, by Douglas Massey and Shawn Kanaiaupuni,75
examines Chicago census tracts to determine whether the existence
of public housing constructed between 1950 and 1970 is related to
the proportion of families with incomes below the poverty line in
1980. In addition to the public housing variable, their model
includes the proportion of blacks and families living in poverty in
1970, the distance of each tract from a public housing project, and
the net migration rate from the tract. Massey and Kanaiaupuni find
a positive, statistically significant relationship between the existence
of public housing in a census tract and the proportion of families in
poverty in 1980.76
The studies by Goldstein and Yancey and Massey and Kanaiau-
puni on the impact of public housing on neighborhood social and
racial composition share a common methodological weakness. The
independent variable of interest, the existence of public housing in
the tract, is a dummy variable taking on the value of "1" if public
housing exists and "0" otherwise. Theory would predict, however,
that the size of a public housing development should be important
in explaining its impact on the neighborhood in which it is located.
If public housing generates negative externalities, extremely small
developments are unlikely to exert as much of an effect on their
neighborhoods as do large developments. We therefore specify a
72See id. at 281.
s See George Galster & Heather Keeney, Subsidized Housing and Racial Change in
Yonkers, New York, 59J. AM. PLAN. Ass'N 172 (1993).
74 See id. at 179-80.
71 See generally Massey & Kanaiaupuni, supra note 48.
71 See id. at 116-17 (noting that the presence of a housing project increased its
1980 poverty rate by 11% and finding that the rate of poverty fell steadily as a tract's
distance from housing projects increased).
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model in which the quantity of public housing units in a census
tract is hypothesized to affect the proportion of poor households in
that tract and surrounding tracts.
The data set used in our analysis merges census tract data from
the United States Census of Population and Housing for the City of
Philadelphia for each decade from 1950 to 1990." Because census
statistics on families earning incomes below the federally prescribed
poverty level are unavailable for years prior to 1970, we use an
alternative definition of poverty. A family is classified as poor if its
total income is less than one-half of the median income of its
metropolitan area. 78  The dependent variable in our model,
NEWPOV, is the ratio of poor to nonpoor families in a census tract.
Levels of poverty in urban neighborhoods are likely to be
affected by a variety of socioeconomic and locational influences. In
our model, we hypothesize that NEWPOV in any year (t) will be
affected by a variety of socioeconomic and locational factors that
existed ten years earlier (t-10). For example, we include as
independent variables the proportions of the population in the
earlier period that were impoverished, unemployed, owner-occu-
pants, and nonwhites. In addition, we include variables to capture
how far the census tract is from the central business district and the
two major subway lines. A full list of the independent variables
contained in our model may be found in Table III.
71
7 Because the tract boundaries in Philadelphia were redrawn between the 1950
and 1960 census and again between 1960 and 1970, it was necessary to aggregate
some tracts to allow comparisons of similar geographic areas over time. This
aggregation of tracts, together with the fact that the Census Bureau suppresses data
when a tract has a very small number of residents or dwellings, cause our annual
sample sizes to fall below the total number of tracts for each year. To accommodate
these different sample sizes, observations were weighted proportionately to the square
root of the number of families in the tract.
" This definition of poverty coincides with the definition of very low-income
households under federal housing law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437a(b)(2) (Supp. V 1993).
Because it was necessary to estimate median metropolitan family income for 1950, we
used an extrapolation based on trends in the ratio of unrelated individuals to families
in the city and suburbs as related to trends in relative median incomes.
" All continuous variables in Table III with the exception of EDUC, EMPLOY,
and MALEMPLOY are expressed in logarithmic form. In addition, because some of
the ratios may have zero denominators, we follow the suggestion of Cox by simulta-
neously weighing the numerator and denominator by 1/2n. See G.S. MADDALA ET AL.,
ECONOMETRICS 33 (1993) (citing D.R. Cox, ANALYSIS OF BINARY DATA 33 (1970)).
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TABLE III
PUBLIC HOUSING LOGIT REGRESSION VARIABLE
DEFINITIONS AND DESCRIPTIONS
DEPENDENT DESCRIPTION
VARIABLE
NEWPOV Ratio of families with incomes 50% below the median
income for the metropolitan area to families with
incomes above this level in census tract
INDEPENDENT DESCRIPTION
VARIABLE'
POV Ratio of families with incomes 50% below the median
income for the metropolitan area to families with
incomes above this level in census tract
POVSQ POV squared
EDUC Median number of school years completed by residents
of census tract
EMPLOY Ratio of persons employed to total population in census
tract
MALEMPLOY Ratio of males employed to total males in census tract
NONWHITE Ratio of nonwhite population to white population in
census tract
OWNER Ratio of owner-occupied housing units to rental housing
units in census tract
PUBLIC Ratio of project-based public housing units to total
occupied housing units that are not project-based
public housing units in census tract
PUBLICSQ PUBLIC squared
CHPUBLIC Increase or decrease in PUBLIC for the ten-year period
immediately preceding the date on which dependent
variable NEWPOV is measured
CHPUBLICSQ CHPUBLIC squared
DBIGPUBLIC Distance (in miles) to nearest public housing develop-
ment with more than 600 housing units
DCBD Distance (in miles) to central business district
DSUBWAY Distance (in miles) to the nearer of the Broad or Market
Street subway lines
YEAR70 Dummy variable for observations in 1970
YEAR80 Dummy variable for observations in 1980
YEAR90 Dummy variable for observations in 1990
All continuous independent variables except CHPUBLIC, DCBD, and DSUBWAY are
measured 10 years before the dependent variable.
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Of particular interest for our study is the effect of three
variables relating to the existence of public housing in a census
tract."0 The first variable, PUBLIC, represents the ratio of project-
based public housing units in a census tract to all housing units that
are not project-based public housing." For each observation,
PUBLIC is measured ten years prior to the dependent variable
NEWPOV. To capture the incremental effect of changes over the
ten years in the proportion of public housing in a neighborhood, we
include the independent variable CHPUBLIC. Finally, we examine
the effect of proximity to especially large public housing develop-
ments by including the variable DBIGPUBLIC, which measures the
distance in miles from the center of a census tract to the nearest
public housing development with more than six hundred apart-
ments. If public housing is related to increased levels of poverty in
urban neighborhoods, we expect the coefficients of PUBLIC and
CHPUBLIC to be positive and statistically significant and
DBIGPUBLIC to be negative and statistically significant.
Table IV presents the results of our logit regression. Alternative
models were also specified and tested with similar results. Most of
the independent variables have the expected signs and many are
statistically significant. Neighborhoods composed of disproportion-
ately high numbers of poor families and persons with low levels of
education are more likely to experience increased levels of poverty
ten years later. Although the variables representing rates of
unemployment and owner-occupancy have signs consistent with
economic theory, they are not statistically significant.
o Throughout this analysis, the three public housing variables exclude public
housing specifically reserved for the elderly.
s To make this ratio approximate the actual ratio of families in public housing to
families not in public housing as closely as possible, we make two adjustments. First,
we count the few zero-bedroom (efficiency) public housing units in Philadelphia as
one-half units, since many will be occupied by single persons and thus, are not
counted as families in the census. Second, we deflate the total number of units in
each project by a factor of .91, which was the official occupancy rate of public
housing in Philadelphia as of December 1993.
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TABLE IV
PUBLIC HOUSING LOGIT REGRESSION RESULTS
(DEPENDENT VARIABLE-NEWPOV)
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT STANDARD ERROR
INTERCEPT 1.5080"
POV 0.8008" 0.916
POVSQ -0.0742- 3.157
EDUC -0.1352- 0.109
EMPLOY 0.0226 0.068
MALEMPLOY -0.3539 0.109
NONWHITE 0.0138 °  3.543
OWNER -0.0224 1.124
PUBLIC 0.2219" 1.942
PUBLICSQ -0.0159" 20.757
CHPUBLIC 0.2694" 0.987
CHPUBLICSQ -0.0270- 6.008
DBIGPUBLIC -0.1382" 0.555
DCBD 0.2034" 0.513
DSUBWAY -0.2593- 0.575
YEAR70 0.2338" 0.444
YEAR80 0.6108" 0.424
YEARg0 0.5341- 0.410
N 1298 1
* Significant at 5% level
Significant at 1% level
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All three public housing variables have the hypothesized signs
and are statistically significant. Holding all other factors constant,
higher concentrations of public housing in a neighborhood
(PUBLIC and CHPUBLIC) are positively related to increased neigh-
borhood poverty rates in the city of Philadelphia. 2 In addition, as
the distance of a census tract from a large public housing develop-
ment (DBIGPUBLIC) increases, its poverty rate declines.
83
The importance of the relationship between concentrations of
public housing and increased neighborhood poverty rates cannot be
interpreted solely from the variable coefficients and significance
levels reported in Table IV. Instead, their significance depends
upon the values of the other variables contained in the logit
equation. We therefore use the coefficients obtained in Table IV to
explore the effect of increased proportions of public housing on
neighborhood poverty rates. For variables other than the propor-
tion of project-based public housing units in the census tract ten
years earlier (PUBLIC), we use mean sample values.84 We can
thereby simulate the increase in poverty attributable to changes in
PUBLIC by selecting alternative values of the variable.
The results of the simulation, reported in Table V, suggest that,
at least in Philadelphia, increased levels of public housing in a
neighborhood have a dramatic effect on neighborhood poverty
rates. An average neighborhood with no public housing units would
be expected to have a 13% poverty rate. The poverty rate would
' The negative and statistically significant coefficients for PUBLICSQ and
CHPUBLICSQ suggest that as public housing concentrations increase, their positive
effect on poverty rates does not increase in a linear fashion.
83 It is possible, as Galster suggests, that increasing concentrations of poverty
within public housing itself may have affected our results with respect to the PUBLIC
and CHPUBLIC variables. See George C. Galster, A Response to Schill and Wachter's
The Spatial Bias of Federal Housing Law and Policy, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 1343, 1344-45
(1995). Nevertheless, it is unlikely that increased proportions of poor people in
public housing would have had much of an effect on DBIGPUBLIC because for most
census tracts it measured the effect of proximity to public housing located in another
census tract. Galster also hypothesizes that our results might be explained by the fact
that public housing developments had high occupancy rates and were located in areas
that had high levels of private market housing abandonment. See id. Although it is
possible that our results might have been affected by this combination of factors, it
is unlikely that it would explain the magnitude of our empirical result. See infra text
accompanying note 85. Furthermore, vacancy rates in several of the public housing
developments in Philadelphia during the period from 1950 to 1990 have been
extremely high. To the extent that private market disinvestment occurs in neighbor-
hoods with public housing, this deterioration may be caused by the negative
externalities of public housing itself.
84 For CHPUBLIC, we use the value "0."
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climb to 31.8% if the neighborhood had an average proportion of
public housing (for census tracts with public housing) in Philadel-
phia. For communities in the highest quintile of public housing
concentration, the poverty rate would jump to 52.1%, a value four
times as high as a neighborhood with no project-based public
housing.
85
TABLE V
PUBLIC HOUSING SIMULATION
PUBLIC 86 QUINTILE PREDICTED POVERTY RATE
0 0 13.0%
0.112 20% 25.2%
0.136 40% 27.1%
0.190 50% 31.8%
0.247 60% 35.9%
0.420 80% 52.1%
Our results for Philadelphia are generally consistent with
Massey's and Kanaiaupuni's findings for Chicago. 7 These results
support the hypothesis that project-based public housing generates
a negative spillover effect in urban neighborhoods. Whether our
findings and those of Massey and Kanaiaupuni are generalizable to
all cities, or even all large cities, must await further empirical
investigation. Certain factors may distinguish Philadelphia and
a' These results are not attributable to the increased number of poor people living
in the public housing itself. We control for this effect by including in the model the
variables POV and CHPUBLIC. Professor Roisman's observation that our results may
be attributable to the city locating public housing in neighborhoods that would be
subject to public sector disinvestment is another possible interpretation of these
results. See Roisman, supra note 62, at 1368-69. Unfortunately, given date
limitations, we cannot control for this possible cause in our model.
" PUBLIC represents the ratio of project-based public housing units to total
occupied housing units that are not project-based public housing units in a census
tract.87 See Massey & Kanaiaupuni, supra note 48, at 114-19 (finding that the existence
of public housing in Chicago is related to increased neighborhood poverty rates).
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Chicago. Historical accounts have documented that decisions about
locating public housing in Chicago and Philadelphia were subject to
much political interference and controversy."8 In addition, public
housing authorities in both cities have experienced severe manage-
ment problems over the past two decades.
8 9
B. Federal Mortgage Assistance Programs
In addition to providing subsidies for the construction of low-
income rental housing, the federal government has actively
promoted home ownership among the working poor and the middle
class through mortgage assistance programs. These programs have
sometimes had the effect of destabilizing inner-city communities
and contributing to their transformation into ghettos. In this
section, we examine how two federal mortgage assistance programs,
which were enacted for very different purposes, had the effect of
contributing to neighborhood destabilization and concentrated
inner-city poverty.
1. The FHA Mortgage Insurance Program
One of the first interventions by the federal government in the
home loan mortgage market was the creation of the Home Owners
Loan Corporation (HOLC) in 1933.90 Prior to the 1930s, most
mortgage loans were nonamortizing, short duration debt obliga-
tions, typically with five- to ten-year terms. During the Great
Depression, financial instability caused many American homeowners
to default on their mortgage loans and threatened many more with
future default and foreclosure. The HOLC was created to refinance
these loans."I FromJuly 1933 toJune 1935, over one million loans,
10% of all residential loans then outstanding, were refinanced
' See, e.g., BAUMAN, supra note 49, at 167-74 (describing how blacks came to
occupy a disproportionate share of public housing in Philadelphia); SQUIRES ET AL.,
supra note 48, at 93-126 (describing how institutional decision-makers influenced the
kinds and location of public housing to be developed in Chicago).
99See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
o See Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-43, ch. 64, § 4, 48 Stat.
128, 129-32, repealed by Housing Amendments of 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-94, § 21(a), 67
Stat. 121, 126.
91 See NATHANIEL S. KEITH, PoLITIcS AND THE HOUSING CRISIS SINCE 1930, at 24
(1973) (noting that the Roosevelt Administration and Congress enacted this
legislation to rescue beleaguered homeowners from foreclosure and to permit lending
institutions to make new mortgages).
1995] SPATIAL BIAS OF FEDERAL HOUSING LAW AND POLICY 1309
by the HOLC.92
One of the most important contributions of the HOLC was the
uniformity it promoted among financial institutions engaged in
residential lending. In addition to introducing the fixed-rate, self-
amortizing long-term mortgage loan, the HOLC also created
uniform appraisal standards throughout the country. HOLC
appraisers divided cities into districts, which they rated in terms of
potential risk. Areas with even relatively small black populations
were usually given the lowest rating indicating a high-risk of default.
One study of HOLC ratings in the St. Louis and Newark metropoli-
tan areas found that the standards used by HOLC appraisers
systematically favored suburban neighborhoods over those in the
central city, even those inner-city neighborhoods with relatively new
and desirable housing.
93
The antiurban underpinnings of the appraisal standards
promulgated by the HOLC particularly harmed cities because they
influenced the operation of one of the most important federal
programs of the past century-the mortgage insurance program of
the Federal Housing Administration (FHA).94 In 1934, Congress
established the FHA and empowered it to guarantee home loan
mortgages. The effect of the federal loan guarantee was enormous.
Lenders, jittery after years of high rates of loan defaults and
foreclosures, could originate home loans free from the risk of loss.
By 1972, the FHA had insured eleven million home purchase
mortgage loans and twenty-two million home improvement loans.
95
In several respects, the FHA mortgage insurance program
contributed to the decline of inner cities. Program guidelines
disfavored "crowded neighborhoods" and "older properties," both
of which were much more prevalent in cities than in the newly
forming suburbs.9 6 For a time, minimum lot size and setback
requirements disqualified row houses, a staple in many urban areas
such as Baltimore and Philadelphia.
97
' See Kenneth T. Jackson, Race, Ethnicity, and Real Estate Appraisal: The Home
Owners Loan Corporation and the Federal Housing Administration, 6 J. URB. HIsT. 419,
421 (1980) (stating that the HOLC covered "one-tenth of all owner-occupied,
nonfarm residences").
" See id. at 425, 428 (describing the higher ratings given to nonblack suburbs in
St. Louis and Newark, respectively).
See id. at 430 ("HOLC appraisal methods ... were adopted by the FHA.").
95 See id. at 432.
' Id. at 435 ("[P]rospective buyers could avoid many of these [problems] ... by
locating in peripheral sections.").
97 See Arnold R. Hirsch, With or Without Jim Crow: Black Residential Segregation in
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Perhaps of even greater consequence, FHA appraisal standards
emulated HOLC guidelines and discouraged lending in areas where
blacks lived. The FHA underwriting manual warned against making
loans in areas with "inharmonius racial groups " 98 and instructed
lenders that
[a]reas surrounding a location are [to be] investigated to deter-
mine whether incompatible racial and social groups are present,
for the purpose of making a prediction regarding the probability
of the location being invaded by such groups. If a neighborhood
is to retain stability, it is necessary that properties shall continue
to be occupied by the same social and racial classes. A change in
social or racial occupancy generally contributes to instability and
a decline in values. 99
The FHA also recommended that municipalities enact racially
restrictive zoning ordinances as well as covenants running with the
land prohibiting black owners.
10 0
Little careful empirical evidence exists to document the effects
of FHA-sponsored "redlining"10 1 of central city communities.
the United States, in URBAN POLICY IN TWENTIETH CENTURY AMERICA, supra note 49,
at 65, 86-87 (noting that "narrow lots" made it more difficult for row houses in
Philadelphia and Baltimore to meet the requirements for FHA loans). In addition,
FHA programs systematically favored owner-occupied homes over multifamily rental
apartment buildings. Because cities had much larger rental housing stocks than
suburbs, this bias harmed central cities. See MARK I. GELFAND, A NATION OF CITIES:
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND URBAN AMERICA, 1933-1965, at 217 (1975) ("[T]he
FHA also cast ajaundiced eye at the predominant form of central city accommoda-
tions: rental housing. The agency considered rental housing, in comparison to
private home construction, a very risky form of investment.").
" Gary Orfield, Federal Policy, Local Power, and Metropolitan Segregation, 89 POL.
Sci. Q. 777, 786 (1975) (quoting FHA Underwriting Manual).
" DENNIS R. JUDD, THE POLITICS OF AMERICAN CITIES: PRIVATE POWER AND
PUBLIC POLICY 281 (1979) (citation omitted) (quoting FHA Underwriting Manual).
"o See GELFAND, supra note 97, at 220 ("[The] FHA helped perfect [racially
restrictive covenants] and virtually made them mandatory."). Racial zoning ordi-
nances were invalidated by the Supreme Court in Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60,
82 (1917) (overturning a municipal ordinance forbidding black households from
moving into residences where the majority of households are white). Racially
discriminatory covenants were held unenforceable in Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1,
23 (1948) (holding that a state court's enforcement of a covenant brought the action
within the scope of state action and thus was unconstitutional).
'0' Redlining obtains its name from the practice of FHA underwriters' circling in
red areas of the city that were bad credit risks. See NATIONAL COMM'N ON URBAN
PROBLEMS, BUILDINC THE AMERICAN CITY 101 (1969) ("There was evidence of a tacit
agreement among all groups-lending institutions, fire insurance companies, and
FHA-to block off certain areas of cities within 'red lines,' and not to loan or insure
within them.").
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However, one study by KennethJackson demonstrates that although
many more single-family homes were constructed in St. Louis than
in its surrounding municipalities, properties in the suburbs received
five times the amount of mortgage insurance as did those in the
city.102 Hirsch similarly reports that one-half of Detroit and one-
third of Chicago were excluded from the program.
10 3
FHA redlining practices may have contributed to the concentra-
tion of poverty in American cities in several ways. First, the bias of
the program toward lending in the suburbs, as compared to the
cities, encouraged middle-income households to leave the city and
exacerbated the income and fiscal disparities between urban and
suburban municipalities.' 4 Second, the racially discriminatory
underwriting practices engaged in by the FHA promoted racial
segregation in American cities and contributed to the creation of
urban ghettos. 5 Lastly, the unavailability of mortgage capital for
purposes of home improvement or home purchase in inner-city
neighborhoods may have contributed to the disinvestment in
housing and decline in property values experienced by most
American cities in the second half of the twentieth century.1
06
102 This relationship exists regardless of whether mortgage insurance is measured
in the aggregate, per capita, or by the number of mortgages insured. See Jackson,
supra note 92, at 442.
"I See Hirsch, supra note 97, at 86. Similar redlining of communities inhabited
by racial minorities took place in Philadelphia. See CAROLYN ADAMS ET AL., PHILADEL-
PHIA: NEIGHBORHOODS, DIVISION, AND CONFLICT IN A POSTINDUSTRIAL CITY 79-81
(1991).
104 See PAUL KANTOR, THE DEPENDENT CITY: THE CHANGING POLITICAL ECONOMY
OF URBAN AMERICA 200 (1988) (stating that FHA policies "virtually ensured that most
FHA-insured properties would be in suburbia rather than in central cities"); Bernard
J. Frieden, Housing and National Urban Goals: Old Policies and New Realities, in THE
METROPOLITAN ENIGMA: INQUIRIES INTO THE NATURE AND DIMENSIONS OF AMERICA'S
"URBAN CRISIS" 159, 184-85 (James Q. Wilson ed., 1968) (indicating that FHA and
other federal programs favored growth of suburbs). The "flight" to the suburbs that
has occurred in many American metropolitan areas since the end of World War II
was also heavily influenced by consumer preferences, technological changes in
transportation and manufacturing processes, and federal subsidies for highway
construction. For a thorough analysis of the causes of metropolitan decentralization,
see generally KENNETH T.JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF
THE UNITED STATES (1985).
05 See DANIEL R. FUSFELD & TIMOTHY BATES, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE
URBAN GHETTO 43 (Susan H. Wilson ed., 1984) (stating that FHA policies "amounted
to a direct federal endorsement of residential segregation"); Orfield, supra note 98,
at 789 ("[T]he federal government was a powerful force for segregation.").
06 Surprisingly, however, no study has carefully documented the causal relation-
ship between redlining and disinvestment. Nevertheless, most urban commentators
and policymakers assume, based upon anecdotal evidence, that the link exists. See
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2. The Section 235 Homeownership Assistance Program
In part to undo the damage created by FHA mortgage redlining
in many urban neighborhoods, Congress enacted the Section 235
Homeownership Assistance Program in 1968.1"7 Section 235 was
designed to make homeownership feasible for lower-income house-
holds. In addition to providing mortgage insurance for the
purchase of one- to four-family homes, the federal government
authorized down payments as low as $200 and subsidized the
interest paid by qualified low-income homebuyers on their mortgage
loans.108 These subsidies reduced interest rates to as low as 1%
per year.
10 9
Section 235 was designed to make capital more available to
lower-income urban homebuyers. From 1969 to 1979, approxi-
mately 500,000 homes were purchased under the program."
0
Nevertheless, in several cities, rather than stabilizing inner-city
communities, Section 235 promoted rapid neighborhood racial
transition and, in some instances, decline. In some communities,
the sudden availability of mortgage capital fueled "blockbust-
ing."' 11 Realtors would sell a few homes to minority purchasers
and spread the rumor that the neighborhood would soon become
entirely black to set off a wave of panic selling. Whites would then
sell their homes at artificially low prices, frequently to the real estate
agents themselves, who would turn around and sell them to
nonwhites at inflated values. Neighborhoods changed from all
white to virtually all black in a matter of months."
2
ERIC H. MONKKONEN, AMERICA BECOMES URBAN: THE DEVELOPMENT OF U.S. CITIES
& TOWNS 1780-1980, at 204 (1988) (stating that FHA policies result in "neighbor-
hood[s] perceived by lenders as risky to in fact become risky, while those perceived
as solid become even more solid"); NATIONAL COMM'N ON URBAN PROBLEMS, supra
note 101, at 101 ("The net result, of course, [of FHA redlining] was that the slums
and the areas surrounding them went downhill farther and faster than before.").
107 Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448, § 235, 82
Stat. 476, 476-77, repealed by Pub. L. No. 100-242, § 401(d), 101 Stat. 1898, 1899
(1988).
.0 See Susan M. Wachter, The 1968 Congressional FHA Amendments to the National
Housing Act: Their Impact on Urban Areas, in THE URBAN IMPACTS OF FEDERAL
POLICIES 426, 427-28 (Norman J. Glickman ed., 1980); Paul Graeser & Martin
Williams, The Economics of Mortgage Foreclosures Under FHA Section 235(i), 5 URB.
ANALYSIS 275, 276 (1978).
'o See BRATT, supra note 50, at 131.
10 See R. ALLEN HAYS, THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT & URBAN HOUSING: IDEOLOGY
& CHANGE IN PUBLIC POLICY 116 (1985).
"I Id. at 114.
11 See MARTIN MAYER, THE BUILDERS: HOUSES, PEOPLE, NEIGHBORHOODS,
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In addition to promoting racial turnover, excessively high loan-
to-value ratios, independently and in conjunction with fraudulent
practices by real estate entrepreneurs and inept administration of
the program by HUD, contributed to community disinvestment. In
several cities, particularly Detroit, Chicago, and St. Louis, local real
estate investors bribed FHA appraisers to overlook structural flaws
and inflate the values of homes sold to Section 235 participants.
Because purchasers were required to put very little of their own
money at risk,"' the investors could sell the homes at inflated
prices. As homebuyers learned that their homes had major
structural defects and that the values of their homes were less than
their outstanding mortgage balances, they abandoned the dwellings
rather than invest money that they did not have in repairs." 4 By
1979, over ninety thousand homes, or approximately 18% of the
dwellings subsidized under Section 235 were assigned to HUD or
foreclosed." 5 In some instances, entire neighborhoods were blight-
ed."
16
GOVERNMENTS, MONEY 164-65 (1978); Calvin Bradford, Financing Home Ownership:
The Federal Role in Neighborhood Decline, 14 URB. AFF. Q. 313, 325-29 (1979).
.. Indeed, in some instances, the down payments were provided by the real estate
investors, themselves. See MAYER, supra note 112, at 165.
114 For descriptions of the abuses under the Section 235 Homeownership Program,
see BRIAN D. BOYER, CITIES DESTROYED FOR CASH: THE FHA SCANDAL AT HUD
(1973); HAYS, supra note 110, at 112-16; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WEAKNESSES
IN ADMINISTRATION OF THE PROGRAM TO CORRECT DEFECTS IN HOUSING INSURED
UNDER THE SECTION 235 PROGRAM (1975); The Bankruptcy of Subsidized Housing, BUS.
WK., May 27, 1972, at 42.
..5 See HAYS, supra note 110, at 116. High rates of foreclosure and abandonment
were exacerbated by the way the design of the program affected the incentives of
mortgagees. Because the interest rate on FHA loans was typically set below the
market interest rate, lenders charged several points at the time the loan was originat-
ed. Prepayment of the loan, through quick foreclosure following default, would
therefore increase the mortgagee's overall rate of return. See Wachter, supra note
108, at 433. In some instances, however, quick foreclosure and resale was inhibited
by federal forbearance regulations. These delays sometimes resulted in waste of the
property, abandonment, and vandalism. See id. at 433-34.
6 See e.g., BOYER, supra note 114, at 141-63, 176-79, 197-205 (describing effects
on communities in Chicago, Detroit, and Philadelphia); JOE T. DARDEN ET AL.,
DETROIT: RACE AND UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT 182 (1987) (describing residential decay
in "vast stretches" of Detroit caused by Section 235 foreclosures and abandonments);
LAWRENCEJ.R. HERSON &JOHN M. BOLLAND, THE URBAN WEB: POLITICS, POLICY,
AND THEORY 293-94 (1990) (describing the effect of Section 235 program on
neighborhoods in Chicago); Bradford, supra note 112, at 329 (describing effects in
Chicago). The negative impact of the Section 235 program on neighborhoods in
certain cities does not necessarily mean that the net effect of the program was
negative. Some analysts have suggested that despite its problems, the Section 235
program had beneficial effects for America's poor. See ANTHONY DOWNS, FEDERAL
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III. CURRENT HOUSING LAW AND POLICY
Although public housing production in the United States has
declined to minimal levels, several elements of federal housing law
and policy continue to promote the concentration of poverty in
inner-city neighborhoods. In this Part, we describe how current
laws governing the public housing program continue to concentrate
poverty in inner-city neighborhoods. In addition, we examine the
locational biases that may result from laws designed to increase the
flow of mortgage funds to inner-city communities.
A. Public Housing
In 1992, a report prepared for the National Commission on
Severely Distressed Public Housing revealed that over 5% of the
nation's stock of public housing required renovations that would
cost over $40,000 per unit.1 7 Congress responded to the Commis-
sion's recommendations by enacting a program that would fund
renovation of some severely distressed public housing develop-
ments, even if the cost of the renovation exceeded the cost of new
construction.' 18 This program reflects the congressional insistence
that the stock of public housing not be diminished. Indeed, since
1987, Congress has insisted that before public housing may be
demolished, each unit must be replaced on a one-for-one basis with
either new public housing or other project-based subsidized
apartments.a19
The effects of the one-for-one replacement requirement have
been pernicious for many inner-city communities. PHAs, lacking
the money to build new units or renovate existing developments,
HOUSING SUBSIDIES: HOW ARE THEY WORKING? 51, 64-65 (1973).
117 See ICF, INC., supra note 52, at 3.
118 See Housing and Community Development Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-550,
§ 111, 106 Stat. 3672, 3687 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 5301 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
For a critique of policies that would renovate severely distressed public housing
developments, see Schill, supra note 28, at 522-43.
119 See Housing and Community Development Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-242,
§ 121(b), 101 Stat. 1815, 1837 (1989) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 14 3 7p (1984 & Supp.
V 1993)). In very limited circumstances, demand-oriented housing subsidies, such as
housing certificates, may be used as replacement housing. Before the Secretary of
HUD may approve a replacement plan including demand-oriented assistance,
however, he must certify that replacement with supply-oriented assistance is not
feasible and that the supply of housing in the area will remain sufficient for certificate
holders throughout the period in which they will receive assistance. See id. These
legislative impediments have made replacement plans with demand-oriented
assistance impractical. See Schill, supra note 28, at 542.
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have often been forced to retain deteriorated or vacant projects
rather than demolish them. 20  These developments blight the
communities in which they are located and provide a home for
illegal activities such as prostitution and drug dealing.
21
Tenant admission rules continue to ensure that public housing
developments will be home to an overwhelmingly poor and
marginalized population. Under federal law, all households that
earn under 80% of their metropolitan area's median income are
eligible for public housing. 2 2  Nevertheless, between 75% and
85% of all public housing units must be reserved for very low-
income households, those who earn less than 50% of median in-
come.1 23 Furthermore, one-half of all public housing units must
be filled according to federally prescribed preference rules. These
'20 Indeed, in several cities, tenants have brought suit against PHAs, charging them
with de facto demolition. Several federal courts have held that tenants may challenge
PHAs under the United States Housing Act for letting projects deteriorate to the
point at which they are uninhabitable. See, e.g., Velez v. Cisneros, 850 F. Supp. 1257,
1270 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (holding that tenants have a private right of action against HUD
for de facto demolition); Henry Horner Mothers Guild v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 824
F. Supp. 808, 819 (N.D. Il1. 1993) (same); Gomez v. Housing Auth. of El Paso, 805 F.
Supp. 1363, 1374-75 (W.D. Tex. 1992) (same), aff'd sub nom., Gomez v. City of El
Paso, 20 F.3d 1169 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 198 (1994); Concerned Tenants
Ass'n of Father Panik Village v. Pierce, 685 F. Supp. 316,321 (D. Conn. 1988) (same).
Even those PHAs with sufficient funds to demolish old units of public housing
and construct replacement housing are frequently stymied by community opposition
and federal regulations on the siting of subsidized housing. Residents of neighbor-
hoods with little or no subsidized housing typically fight the introduction of low and
moderate income housing through political action and litigation. See, e.g., Project
B.A.S.I.C. v. Kemp, 776 F. Supp. 637, 644 (D.R.I. 1991) (denying a motion for
summaryjudgment in a lawsuit challenging replacement housing on the ground that
it would be constructed in areas of minority concentration), rev'd, 947 F.2d 11 (1st
Cir. 1991); George Judson, Uproar in New Haven on Public Housing Role, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 30, 1991, at BI (describing community opposition to PHA purchasing homes
as replacement housing). In addition, HUD regulations provide that most federally
subsidized housing, including housing built to replace demolished public housing
developments, may not be constructed in areas of minority concentration or in
neighborhoods containing an "undue concentration" of persons living in poverty. See
24 C.F.R. §§ 770.101-.105, 882.708(c), 941.202(c), 970.11(h) (1993). Therefore,
replacing demolished public housing in neighborhoods that already contain large
proportions of poor or minority households is often also impossible.
121 See Testimony ofJudy A. England-Joseph, U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Before
House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight (Feb. 22, 1995) (on file with
authors); Bruce Alpert, Repair Costlier than Rebuilding, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans),
Mar. 23, 1994, at Al.
1- See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437a(b)(2), 1437d(c) (1988).
123 See § 1437a(b)(2) ("'[V]ery low income families' means lower income families
whose incomes do not exceed 50 per centum of the median family income for the
area. .. ").
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regulations grant priority in admissions to particularly needy
households such as those occupying substandard housing and those
composed of homeless families.
1 24
Federal rules governing the computation of rents continue to
promote the concentration of poverty in- public housing by creating
disincentives for residents who are unemployed to obtain work and
by discouraging those who do work from remaining in public hous-
ing. 125 Because the rents paid by tenants are set at 30% of their
incomes, those who find jobs face an implicit tax of approximately
one-third of their earnings. When combined with the loss of social
services and health care benefits that frequently accompany the
transition to employment for poor people, this increase in rent may
provide a substantial disincentive to join the labor force. 12' For
those tenants who do take jobs, 30% of their income in many
instances exceeds the fair market value of their apartments.127
Rather than pay more than their apartments are worth, these
tenants leave public housing, further intensifying the concentration
of poverty within its walls.
128
B. Community Reinvestment Act
In 1991 and 1992, reports that racial and ethnic minority home
purchasers were significantly more likely than whites to be rejected
when they applied for home mortgage loans shook the housing
policy and finance communities. One report by Glenn Canner
129
124 See § 1437d(c)(4)(A)(i)-(ii).
1 See U.S. Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev., Explanation and Justification for the
Housing Choice and Community Investment Act of 1994, in Statements on Introduced
Bills and Joint Resolutions, 140 CONG. REc. S4835, S4838 (daily ed. Apr. 26, 1994)
[hereinafter HUD Document] (discussing the effect of current federal rent
computation rules).
126 See id. at S4845-46 (discussing the disincentives of the 30% method).
12 See id. (discussing the unfairness of using the 30% method when this exceeds
the value of the housing).
1 In 1992, Congress authorized PHAs to establish ceiling rents for their housing
stocks. These ceiling rents, however, could be no less than the amount of debt
service and operating expenses attributable to units of similar size in developments
owned by the PHAs. See Pub. L. No. 102-550 § 102(a), 106 Stat. 3672, 3683 (1992)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1437a(a)(2)(A) (1988 & Supp. V 1993)). Recent
Clinton Administration proposals to liberalize the rent setting mechanisms of PHAs
argue that the existing ceiling rent formula still produces a rent that in many
instances is higher than the units' fair market values. See HUD Document, supra note
125, at S4846.
"2 See generally Glenn B. Canner, Home Mortgage Disclosure Act: Expanded Data on
Residential Lending, 77 Fed. Res. Bull. 859 (1991).
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analyzed data disclosed by financial institutions under the Home
Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975 (HMDA)."'3 These data showed
that among applicants for conventional home purchase loans in
1990, blacks and Hispanics were rejected 33.9% and 21.4% of the
time, respectively, as compared to a rejection rate of 14.4% for
white households.1 "' In addition, applicants applying for loans to
purchase homes in predominantly minority areas were substantially
more likely to be rejected than households applying in white
neighborhoods.13 2  Canner was careful to qualify these stark
findings as not necessarily indicative of discrimination against
minority borrowers or minority neighborhoods by financial institu-
tions. 13  Nevertheless, the publication of these results provoked
the attention of policymakers and calls for further research to learn
whether or not discrimination was indeed occurring.
In 1992, the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston released a detailed
study of whether financial institutions in Boston discriminated
against individual home mortgage loan applicants."3 The authors
did not rely solely upon HMDA data. Instead, they supplemented
it with records on individual loan applicants from mortgage
originators. The study uses logit regression models to estimate the
effect that being black or Hispanic or living in a black neighborhood
"s' Pub. L. No. 94-200, 84 Stat. 1125 (1975) (codified in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C.). Prior to 1990, lenders were required by HMDA to disclose the aggregate
number and dollar value of loans originated by census tract for each of their market
areas. Because these data did not disclose characteristics of individual borrowers,
their usefulness in assessing financial institution lending patterns was limited. HMDA
was amended in 1989 to require financial institutions to make available information
about individual applicants by census tract, including their income, sex, race, the loan
amount requested, and whether their applications were approved or rejected. These
data formed the basis for Canner's analysis. See Canner, supra note 129, at 859.
151 See Canner, supra note 129, at 868. Similar results were reported for 1991 and
1992. See Glenn B. Canner & Delores S. Smith, Expanded HMDA Data on Residential
Lending: One Year Later, 78 Fed. Res. Bull. 801, 808-09 (1992); Glenn B. Canner et
al., Residential Lending to Low-Income and Minority Families: Evidence from the 1992
HMDA Data, 80 Fed. Res. Bull. 79 (1994).
132 See Canner, supra note 129, at 872-73.
1s See id. at 880-81.
3 See ALICIA H. MUNNELL ET AL., MORTGAGE LENDING IN BOSTON: INTERPRETING
HMDA DATA (Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Working Paper No. 92-7, 1992).
Another study by Schill and Wachter, however, found no evidence to support the
hypothesis that mortgage originators in Boston or Philadelphia discriminated against
loan applicants based upon the racial composition of the neighborhoods in which
they sought to purchase homes. See Michael H. Schill & Susan M. Wachter, A Tale
of Two Cities: Racial and Ethnic Geographic Disparities in Home Mortgage Lending in
Boston and Philadelphia, 4 J. HOUSING RES. 245, 272 (1993) ("Our results do not
support the hypothesis that financial institutions redline neighborhoods.").
1318 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 143: 1285
has on the probability of being rejected for a mortgage loan in
Boston. After controlling for an array of socioeconomic, locational,
and credit history variables, the authors found that being black or
Hispanic was significantly related to having one's loan application
denied. They estimated that, on average, blacks and Hispanics were
56% more likely than whites to be rejected.'3 5 The authors,
however, failed to find a significant relationship between the racial
and ethnic composition of neighborhoods and loan rejection.
3 6
These empirical results, suggesting that racial minorities were
being discriminated against by financial institutions, set off a
firestorm of debate in Washington. Much of this debate focused on
efforts to expand the scope and strengthen enforcement of the
Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 (CRA).3 7 Congress enact-
ed the CRA to eliminate the practice of redlining. Although the
word "redlining" probably meant different things to different
members of Congress, s1 3  the sponsor of the legislation, Senator
William Proxmire, defined it as follows:
By redlining let me make clear what I am talking about, I am
talking about the fact that banks and savings and loans will take
their deposits from a community and instead of reinvesting them
in that community, they will invest them elsewhere, and they will
135 See MUNNELL ET AL., supra note 134, at 34. The Boston Federal Reserve Bank
study has been replicated by members of the Housing Research staff of the Federal
National Mortgage Association. Their results substantially support the validity of the
earlier study. See James H. Carr & Isaac F. Megbolugbe, The Federal Reserve Bank of
Boston Study on Mortgage Lending Revisited, 4J. HOUSING RES. 277, 311 (1993) ("Our
study confirms these results and refutes recent reports that attempted to discredit the
original Boston Fed Research."). Other studies have been more critical of the
methodology of the Boston Fed. See, e.g., Mitchell B. Rachlis & Anthony M.J. Yezer,
Serious Flaws in Statistical Tests for Discrimination in Mortgage Markets, 4 J. HOUSING
RES. 315, 326-30 (1993) (noting the econometric problems with studies such as the
Boston Fed's); Stan Liebowitz, A Study That Deserves No Credit, WALL ST. J., Sept. 1,
1993, at A14; Mark Zandi, Boston Fed's Bias Study Was Deeply Flawed, AM. BANKER,
Aug. 19, 1993, at 13.
'36 See MUNNELL ET AL., supra note 134, at 59. For similar findings on the impact
of neighborhood racial and ethnic characteristics on loan acceptance and rejection,
see Schill & Wachter, supra note 134, at 266-68.
137 Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-125, tit. VIII, 91 Stat.
1147 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-05 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)). In
addition, the Justice Department and HUD have reached an agreement to share
information regarding possible lawsuits against lenders under the Fair Housing Act.
For a discussion of the Fair Housing Act, see infra text accompanying notes 167-188.
138 See ROLAND E. BRANDEL & DAVID E. TEITELBAUM, THE COMMUNITY REINVEST-
MENT ACT: POLICIES AND COMPLIANCE I 1.01(c), at 1-6 (2d ed. 1995) ("The term
'redlining' meant different things to those who used it in 1977, referring in a variety
of contexts to a variety of practices and results.").
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actually or figuratively draw a red line on a map around the areas
of their city, sometimes in the inner city, sometimes in the older
neighborhoods, sometimes ethnic and sometimes black, but often
encompassing a great area of their neighborhood.5 9
The CRA requires
each appropriate Federal financial supervisory agency to use its
authority when examining financial institutions, to encourage such
institutions to help meet the credit needs of the local communities
in which they are chartered consistent with the safe and sound
operation of such institutions. 40
The primary tool that these federal financial supervisory agencies
have to achieve the purposes of the CRA is the power to approve or
disapprove applications for bank charters, deposit insurance,
branching, mergers, and the purchase of shares in other regulated
financial institutions.
1 4 1
The federal supervisory agencies have developed criteria upon
which they judge whether a member institution has met its CRA
requirements. 142 Among the criteria are the following: geograph-
ic distribution of the institution's credit extensions, applications,
and denials; its record of originating loans in its community; any
practices that either discourage loan applications or that constitute
prohibited discrimination; and financial participation in local
community development programs. 143 Although the federal
supervisory agencies are empowered to deny merger and branching
applications on the part of member institutions, until recently they
have used this power very sparingly.
Nevertheless, many financial institutions have responded to the
CRA by establishing elaborate community reinvestment plans and
activities. Most large banks have hired full-time community rein-
vestment officers. In addition, many banks have inaugurated
programs that seek to increase the flow of mortgage funds to inner-
13 123 CONG. REC. S8958 (daily ed. June 6, 1977).
140 12 U.S.C. § 2901(b) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
' See §§ 2902-03.
142 These criteria are currently in the process of being revised. See Community
Reinvestment Act Regulations, 58 Fed. Reg. 67,466, 67,466 (1993) (to be codified at
12 C.F.R. pts. 25, 228, 345, 563e).
" Other criteria include efforts to ascertain the credit needs of an institution's
community, participation of its board of directors in developing a community
reinvestment strategy, marketing activities, participation in government-guaranteed
or subsidized loan programs, and ability to meet the credit needs of its communities
given its particular circumstances. See 12 C.F.R. § 228.7 (1988) (discussing assessment
criteria for banks in Federal Reserve System).
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city communities and racial minorities.' In addition to tradition-
al lending, a growing number of financial institutions invest in
community development corporation housing and economic
development projects.'
Following publication of the 1990 HMDA data and the Boston
Federal Reserve Bank study, several legislative and regulatory efforts
have been made to strengthen the CRA. For example, bills have
been introduced in Congress to broaden the scope of the CRA to
include foreign banks, credit unions, and mortgage banks.' In
addition, at the urging of the Clinton Administration, the federal
regulatory agencies charged with enforcing the CRA have published
proposed regulations that set standards for judging financial
institution performance.'4 7 Indeed, over the past two years, these
agencies have more vigorously enforced the CRA, rejecting the
applications of several financial institutions for mergers and charter
changes.1
48
As our discussion of the impact of the Section 235 Home-
ownership Program demonstrates, government programs that seek
to target spatially the flow of home finance capital may have
unintended negative consequences.'49  On the one hand, in-
creased levels of homeownership in the inner city may help stabilize
declining neighborhoods and even promote the inmigration of
marginally higher income households. On the other hand, some
studies report higher than average rates of default among poor and
44 See, e.g., EDWIN S. MILLS & LUAN S. LUBUELE, PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OF
COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT LENDING PROGRAMS (1993) (evaluating several community
lending programs); Daniel D. Pearlman & Roger L.Q. Nguyen, The Community
Reinvestment Act: 15 Years Later, 21 HOUSING L. BULL. 117, 121-26 (1991) (discussing
CRA initiatives).
145 See KENNETH H. THOMAS, COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT PERFORMANCE: MAKING
CRA WORK FOR BANKS, COMMUNITIES AND REGULATORS 133-40 (1993) (describing
community development activities of banks with "outstanding" CRA ratings).
146 See, e.g., H.R. 1700, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) (proposing the Community
Reinvestment Act Reform Act of 1992).
1
47 See 59 Fed. Reg. 51,232 (1994) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 25, pt. 563c)
(proposed Oct. 7, 1994); see also Regulatory Plan for FY 1995, 59 Fed. Reg. 57,168,
57,170 (1994) (describing the issuance of revised regulations supplementing the CRA
as a "major priority").
148 See, e.g., Fed Bars Acquisitions, WALL ST.J., May 19, 1993, at A6 (reporting the
Federal Reserve Board's denial of a proposed acquisition of bank holding companies
by First Colonial Bankshares Corporation because of its poor community lending
record); Robyn Meredith, OTS Cites Poor CRA Grades in Blocking Four Charter Flips,
AM. BANKER, Feb. 22, 1994, at 4 (discussing the rejection of charter changes because
of low CRA ratings).
149 See supra text accompanying notes 110-16.
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minority borrowers. 5 ' To the extent that the CRA encourages
financial institutions to take undue risks in accepting the loan
applications of poor and minority households in predominantly
poor and minority neighborhoods, and to the extent that these
households ultimately default on their loans, neighborhood
disinvestment could be exacerbated.
Enforcement of the CRA may also intensify the spatial concen-
tration of poverty in America's cities. As part of their investigation
to determine whether financial institutions are meeting their
obligations under the CRA, federal regulators examine geographic
patterns of loan origination as well as evidence of possible racially
discriminatory practices.' In addition, federal regulators look
for a correspondence between deposits in a neighborhood and the
amount of loans originated there. 5 2  In order to meet their
obligations under the CRA and to insulate themselves against
challenges by neighborhood advocacy groups, financial institutions
may be willing to make loans to marginal borrowers when they
apply for loans to purchase homes in predominantly poor neighbor-
hoods. These lending practices may create a "loan concentration
effect," effectively steering poor homebuyers to poor neighbor-
hoods. Similarly, to the extent that federal regulators examine
racial patterns of acceptance and rejection, financial institutions
may make it easier for racial or ethnic minorities to obtain loans in
predominantly minority communities than in white neighborhoods.
To examine whether patterns of loan acceptances are consis-
tent 53 with the hypothesis that the CRA promotes loan concentra-
tion effects, we model the lender's decision to accept or reject a
borrower. This decision is hypothesized to be a function of the
economic determinants of risk and expected return. In any
particular census tract, the probability that an applicant will be
rejected can be expressed as follows:
Prob (P), =f(j, , i, C, P,*C1 )
'5 See James A. Berkovec et al., Race, Redlining, and Residential Mortgage Loan
Performance, 9J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECoN. 263, 287 (1994).
5 See 12 C.F.R. § 228.7(e)-(f) (1994).
152 See THOMAS, supra note 145, at 117, 189-90.
'5 Our econometric analysis can only determine whether lending patterns are
consistent with loan concentration effects attributable to the CRA. Alternative
hypotheses may explain why these loan concentrations are observable. See infra text
accompanying notes 155-56.
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where P is the probability that a mortgage loan application by
individual i for a dwelling unit in census tractj is rejected; 1i and C
are sets of risk-related individual loan application and census tract
characteristics, respectively; and PT and C, are income and area
income composition variables. P = I if the loan application is
rejected and P = 0 if the application is accepted. To test whether
loan concentration effects occur, we include a term that interacts
individual borrower and neighborhood income (Pi*Cj).
Table VI sets forth the independent or "control" variables in our
model. With respect to individual risk-related characteristics of
applicants, among other variables, we include in our model the
applicant's net worth, credit history, loan-to-value ratio, debt-to-
income ratio, employment status, and whether his or her household
income is less than 80% of the area's median income.154  The
proxies for census tract risk include variables measuring median
household income, house value, proportion of housing that is
owner-occupied, residential vacancy rates, and a dummy variable
indicating whether the median income of households in the tract is
greater than or equal to 80% of the area's median income. With
respect to race- and ethnicity-related variables, we include dummy
variables for whether the applicant is black or Hispanic and
variables measuring the proportion of the census tract households
headed by a black or Hispanic person. The dependent variable in
our model is a dummy variable that takes on the value of "1" if the
applicant is rejected for a loan and the value of "0" if he or she is
accepted.
1'4 The 80% cut-off corresponds to the definition of a low-income household in
the Housing Act of 1937. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
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TABLE VI
MORTGAGE APPLICATION REJECTION LOGIT REGRESSION
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS AND DESCRIPTIONS
DEPENDENT DESCRIPTION
VARIABLE
REJECT Dummy variable with value of "I" if applicant was
rejected for a loan and "0" if he she was accepted
INDEPENDENT DESCRIPTION
VARIABLE
Dummy variable with value of "1" if ratio of housing
expense to income is greater than 0.3 and "0" if not
Ratio of total debt to household income
Net Worth (in $1000s)
Scaled values (1-5) of consumer credit history with "5"
representing highest risk
Scaled values (0-3) of mortgage payment credit history
with "3" representing highest risk
Scaled values (0-5) of public record credit history with
"5" representing highest risk
Probability of unemployment in applicant's industry
Dummy variable with value of "1" if applicant is self-
employed and "0" if not
Ratio of loan amount requested to appraised value of
property
Dummy variable with value of "1" if unit is in multi-
family building and "0" if not
Dummy variable with value of "1" if applicant is black
and "0" if not
Dummy variable with value of "1" if applicant is
Hispanic and "0" if not
Median household income in census tract
Median value of owner-occupied units in census tract
Median age of structures in census tract
Proportion of households in census tract that are
owner-occupants
Proportion of units in census tract that are vacant
Proportion of households receiving public assistance in
census tract
REXPINC
ROBLINC
NW
CHISTORY
MHISTORY
PHISTORY
PUNEMPL
SELF
LARATIO
MULFAM
BLACK
HISP
MEDHHINC
MEDVALUE
MEDAGSTR
ROWN
RVACUNIT
RWELFARE
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HHRBLACK Proportion of households headed by a black person in
census tract
HHRSPAN Proportion of households headed by an Hispanic
person in census tract
GHISTORY Dummy variable with value of "1" if applicant's credit
history meets financial institution's loan guidelines
and "0" if not
NREVIEW Number of times loan application was reviewed by
underwriter
UNVINF Dummy variable with value of "1" if application contains
unverifiable information and "0" if it does not
LOMODIND Dummy variable with value of "1" if applicant's house-
hold income is less than 80% of the metropolitan
median income and "0" if higher
NLOWAREA Dummy variable with value of "1" if applicant is seeking
a loan in a census tract with a median household income
greater to or equal to 80% of the metropolitan
median household income and "0" if not
INTERACT Dummy variable with a value of "1" if applicant is a
LOMODIND seeking a loan in a NLOWAREA and "0"
if not
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If loan concentration effects occur, we would expect that the
variable (INTERACT), measuring the interaction of being a low-
income individual (LOWMODIND) applying for a loan in an area
that is not composed of low-income households (NLOWAREA) to
have a positive sign and be statistically significant. In other words,
if loan concentration effects occur, low-income applicants applying
in nonpoor areas should have a greater chance of being rejected
than low-income people applying in low-income neighborhoods.
Importantly, although a positive and statistically significant value
for the INTERACT variable would be consistent with the hypothesis
that the CRA causes poor people to have more success when
applying for loans in poor areas than in nonpoor areas, it would not
necessarily prove that the legislation is having this effect. Instead,
loan concentration effects may occur for reasons unrelated to the
CRA. For example, as a result of informational economies,
neighborhood banks may have better information on nearby areas
than other financial institutions.155 Another possible explanation
for loan concentration effects would be discriminatory racial
steering practices, especially in metropolitan areas where race is
highly correlated with income.
1 56
To test our hypothesis of loan concentration effects, we use a
subset of the data collected by the Boston Federal Reserve Bank in
1990 from financial institutions in the Boston metropolitan area.
Each applicant's record was matched with data from the 1990
Census of Population and Housing to obtain characteristics of the
census tract in which he or she was seeking to purchase a
house. 5 7 The model was then estimated using a logit regression.
The results are set forth in Table VII.
155 Cf. LEONARD I. NAKAMURA, LOAN SCREENING WITHIN AND OUTSIDE OF
CUSTOMER RELATIONSHIPS (Federal Reserve Bank of Phila. Working Paper No. 93-15,
1993); Leonard I. Nakamura, Information Externalities: Why Lending May Sometimes
Need a Jump Start, FED. RESERVE BANK OF PHILA. Bus. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1993, at 3, 3.
15 For a more detailed explanation of alternative explanations for an empirical
finding of loan concentration effects, see Michael H. Schill & Susan M. Wachter,
Borrower and Neighborhood Racial and Income Characteristics and Financial Institution
Mortgage Application Screening, 9 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 223 (1994).
157 Because of confidentiality restrictions, the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston has
not released its entire data set. Therefore, our study is based upon a subset of the
Boston Federal Reserve Bank's data set and is augmented by HMDA data released in
1990. This subset does not indicate census tract information for individual
applicants. To determine census tracts, we matched Boston Federal Reserve Bank
information to HMDA applicant data which do provide census tract identifiers. For
observations for which this match could not be made (347 observations out of a total
of 3061), we used mean census tract values.
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TABLE VII
MORTGAGE APPLICATION REJECTION REGRESSION RESULTS
(DEPENDENT VARIABLE-PROBABILITY OF REJECTION)
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT STANDARD ERROR
INTERCEPT -0.883 1.004
REXPINC 0.269 0.203
ROBLINC 0.053- 0.010
NW 6 x e
-5  1 x e- 4
CHISTORY -0.027 0.057
MHISTORY 0.122 0.154
PHISTORY 0.629"" 0.249
PUNEMPL 0.074"" 0.035
SELF 0.613- 0.238
LARATIO 1.553- 0.627
MULFAM 0.815"'" 0.229
BLACK 0.114 0.236
HISP 0.175 0.305
MEDHHINC -1 x e-5  2 x e-5
MEDVALUE 3 x e
- 6  2 x e- 6
MEDAGSTR -0.023" 0.009
ROWN -0.006 0.009
RVACUNIT -0.015 0.022
RWELFARE 0.059"" 0.030
HHRBLACK 0.010 0.006
HHRSPAN 0.038" 0.023
GHISTORY -3.512- 0.259
NREVIEW -0.295- 0.077
UNVINF 3.216"" 0.270
LOMODIND -0.946- 0.337
NLOWAREA -0.485" 0.281
INTERACT 1.591"" 0.413
* Significant at 10% level
.. Significant at 5% level
Significant at 1% level
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Most of the variables in our model have the expected signs and
many are statistically significant. For example, higher probabilities
of unemployment (PUNEMPL), larger loan-to-value ratios
(LARATIO), and blemished credit records (PHISTORY) are all
positively related to being rejected for a mortgage loan. Home-
buyers in areas with higher proportions of residents receiving public
assistance (RWELFARE) are more likely to be rejected, whereas
those applying in areas that are not predominantly low-income
neighborhoods (NLOWAREA) are less likely to have their applica-
tions turned down.
As our hypothesis predicts, however, once the income of the
loan applicant is interacted with the income of the neighborhood in
which he or she seeks to purchase a home, a different result
emerges. Instead of being less likely to be rejected when they apply
for loans in nonpoor neighborhoods, low-income applicants face a
higher probability of rejection. This result would be unsurprising
had we not controlled for borrower, loan, and neighborhood
characteristics. Our model, however, did control for these risk
factors. With all of these characteristics held constant, low-income
people have a higher probability of being accepted for mortgage
loans in poor neighborhoods than elsewhere. 158 Moreover,
nonpoor households who are otherwise similar to poor households
have a higher probability of being rejected in low-income neighbor-
hoods.
Indeed, the magnitude of this loan concentration effect is
substantial. In Table VIII, we use the results of our logit regression
to predict the rejection rates of poor and nonpoor persons who are
applying for loans in poor and nonpoor neighborhoods. We find
that an average low-income person applying for a loan in a predomi-
nantly nonpoor neighborhood is almost three times more likely to
be rejected than if he or she had applied in a neighborhood
predominantly composed of poor residents. Although these results
do not prove that the CRA creates incentives that cause the
concentration of low-income homebuyers in low-income neighbor-
hoods,' 59 they are consistent with that hypothesis.
16 0
1"3 We also find that when the race of the individual applicant is interacted with
the race of the neighborhood in which she is seeking to purchase a home, similar
loan concentration effects occur. See infra note 161 and accompanying text.
'
59 See supra text accompanying notes 155-56 for a description of alternative
hypotheses that might also explain our empirical result.
" The existence of loan concentration effects may not necessarily be harmful to
individual neighborhoods. To the extent that increased levels of homeownership
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TABLE VIII
MORTGAGE APPLICATION REJECTION RATE SIMULATION
CENSUS TRACT MEDIAN CENSUS TRAcT MEDIAN
HOUSEHOLD INCOME < HOUSEHOLD INCOME >
80% OF METRO. MEDIAN 80% OF METRO. MEDIAN
(LOWAREA) (NLOWAREA)
Applicant Income
< 80% of Metro. 4.25% 11.82%
Median Income
Applicant Income
> 80% of Metro. 10.26% 6.58%
Median Income
In an earlier study, we also found evidence of racial concentra-
tion effects. 6 ' Instead of interacting the income of individuals
with the income of individual census tracts, we interacted the race
of loan applicants with the racial composition of the neighborhoods
in which they were seeking to purchase homes. We found that
black applicants were more likely than white applicants to be
accepted in predominantly black neighborhoods.
IV. DECONCENTRATING THE INNER-CITY POOR
162
Federal housing laws and policies, past and present, have
contributed to the spatial segregation of poor people and racial and
ethnic minorities in America's cities. Just as federal law has helped
create the problem, federal law could also help to provide the
solution. Policymakers have the tools at their disposal to reverse
these patterns and promote economic and racial integration. This
Part discusses how stepping up enforcement of antidiscrimination
laws, enhancing the supply of affordable housing in economically
integrated communities, and altering the public housing program
could facilitate the deconcentration of poverty in urban America.
stabilize inner-city communities, encouraging low-income homebuyers to remain in
their neighborhoods may improve these communities.
161 See Schill & Wachter, supra note 156, at 235.
162 Part IV is not coauthored. It reflects the views of Professor Schill, but not
necessarily those of Professor Wachter.
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A. Antidiscrimination Law
The Boston Federal Reserve Bank study of home mortgage
lending patterns, together with recent disclosures of data pursuant
to HMDA have focused the public's attention on racial discrimina-
tion in the home loan mortgage market. Studies indicate, however,
that racial discrimination continues to pervade the housing market.
In 1989, for example, the Urban Institute undertook a large study
of discrimination in twenty-five metropolitan areas and found that
53% of black renters and 59% of black home purchasers could be
expected to encounter at least one incident of racially motivated
discrimination.1 63 Among Hispanics, the expected incidence of
discrimination was 46% and 56% for renters and homebuyers,
respectively.
164
In most large American cities, discrimination in the housing
market contributes to the segregation of minority households in
inner-city neighborhoods.1 65 Because race is often correlated with
income, racial discrimination and segregation frequently translate
into high concentrations of very poor people in America's inner
cities. 66
'63 See MARGERY A. TURNER ET AL., HOUSING DIScRIMINATION STUDY: SYNTHESIS
at vi-vii (1991). The methodology used by the Urban Institute to detect discrimina-
tion is called the fair housing audit. To conduct the audit, sales or rental advertise-
ments are randomly selected from newspapers. Pairs of testers, one minority and one
majority, are then sent separately to real estate agents' offices where they pose as
potential purchasers or renters. Pairs of testers are matched on most characteristics
other than race so that discrimination may be inferred from differential treatment.
See id. at i-ii.
"' See id. at vi-vii; cf. Susan M. Wachter & Isaac F. Megbolugbe, Racial and Ethnic
Disparities in Homeownership, 3 HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 333,359 (1992) (finding wide
disparities in homeownership rates between Hispanic and non-Hispanic households).
" The most commonly used measure of segregation is the index of dissimilarity.
This index represents the proportion of a metropolitan area's population that would
have to move to achieve an even distribution of minority groups throughout the
metropolitan area. A high index of dissimilarity is generally thought to be 60. See
MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 14, at 221. One recent study of the 30 metropolitan
areas in the United States with the largest black populations reveals that in northern
areas the average index value is 77.8 and in southern areas the average value is 66.5.
See id. at 222. Some metropolitan areas, particularly those in the Northeast and
Midwest, have staggeringly high levels of segregation. Chicago (85.8) and Newark
(82.5) are demonstrative. See id. (listing figures from a 1990 study). For a discussion
of the causes of race segregation, see Michael H. Schill & Susan M. Wachter, Housing
Market Constraints and Spatial Stratification by Income and Race, 6 HOUSING POL'Y
DEBATE 141 (1995).
"n The extent to which income differences between whites and blacks contribute
to racial, as opposed to income, segregation is a matter of some debate. Several
studies suggest that income differences explain only a small proportion of racial
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High levels of race discrimination and segregation in American
cities are at least partially attributable to a lack of enforcement of
federal antidiscrimination laws. Discrimination by race in the
housing market is outlawed by a number of federal laws. Public
landlords such as PHAs are forbidden to discriminate by the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.'6 7 Discrimination
in the private market is similarly made illegal by Title VIII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1968, commonly referred to as the Fair Housing
Act. 6 ' The Fair Housing Act not only prohibits discrimination by
most home sellers and landlords,'69 but also extends to real estate
agents70 and home mortgage loan originators.'
7'
segregation. See, e.g., KARL E. TAEUBER & ALMA F. TAEUBER, NEGROES IN CITIES:
RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION AND NEIGHBORHOOD CHANGE 84-85 (1965) (finding that
only about one-third of race segregation is explained by income differences between
whites and blacks); John F. Kain, Housing Market Discrimination and Black Sub-
urbanization in the 1980s, in DIVIDED NEIGHBORHOODS: CHANGING PATTERNS OF
RACIAL SEGREGATION 68, 71-77 (Gary A. Tobin ed., 1987) (examining data from
Chicago and finding that socioeconomic differences only partially explain residence
patterns of blacks). But cf. George C. Galster & W. Mark Keeney, Race, Residence,
Discrimination, and Economic Opportunity: Modeling the Nexus of Urban Racial Phe-
nomena, 24 URB. AFF. Q. 87, 105 (1988) (finding that the variable that captures the
interaction of housing-price segmentation and interracial economic disparities is the
"most potent exogenous component of segregation and discrimination").167 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
16 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619, 3631 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (prohibiting discrimina-
tion in the sale or rental of housing). Additional laws prohibiting discrimination are
§ 1982 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1988) (stating that "[a]ll
citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State and Territory,
as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and
convey real and personal property"), and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1691 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (prohibiting discrimination in credit transactions).
169 See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (making it illegal to refuse to sell or rent "to any person
because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin"). Sales of
single-family homes by persons who own three or fewer houses are exempt from the
Fair Housing Act if the seller does not use the services of a real estate broker and
does not advertise. See § 3603(b)(1). Similarly, landlords who live in and own
buildings occupied by no more than four families are also exempt from the
prohibitions of the Fair Housing Act. See § 3603(b)(2).
170 See §§ 3605(b)(2)-3606; see also Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441
U.S. 91, 115 (1979) (holding that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge alleged
discriminatory acts of real estate agents); Chicago v. Matchmaker Real Estate Sales
Ctr., Inc., 982 F.2d 1086, 1096 (7th Cir. 1992) (finding a real estate agency liable for
racial steering), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2961 (1994); Heights Community Congress v.
Hilltop Realty, Inc., 774 F.2d 135, 141 (6th Cir. 1985) (same), cert. denied, 475 U.S.
1019 (1986).
171 See § 3605(b)(1); see also Steptoe v. Savings of Am., 800 F. Supp. 1542, 1547
(N.D. Ohio 1992) (holding that a lender's discriminatory appraisal policies violate the
Fair Housing Act); Watson v. Pathway Fin., 702 F. Supp. 186, 189 (N.D. Ill. 1988)
(holding that the approval of applications of white borrowers with late payment
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It is likely that the persistence of high levels of race discrimina-
tion in the housing market, a quarter century after the passage of
the Fair Housing Act, is at least partially attributable to weak
enforcement of the law.'72 In a legislative compromise to gain
passage of the Act, its sponsors agreed to eliminate from the bill
HUD's authority to hold hearings and issue complaints and cease
and desist orders.173 In addition, punitive damages for violating
the Act were limited to $1000.174
In 1988, Congress significantly strengthened federal enforce-
ment powers under the Fair Housing Act. The Fair Housing Act
Amendments of 198817 empower HUD to initiate investigations
of possible violations without receiving a formal complaint. 176 In
addition, when it receives private complaints, HUD must investigate
and issue a determination as to whether cause exists to believe that
a violation of the Act has occurred. 77 If such a cause determina-
tion is issued, the complainant may elect to have the matter resolved
before an administrative law judge or litigated in federal court.
1 7 8
If the case is litigated in federal court, the Department of Justice
must prosecute the matter.7 9  The Act also provides for the
discretionary payment of attorney's fees to prevailing parties
1 8 0
and punitive damages.'
8 '
Federal enforcement efforts under the Fair Housing Act and the
Fair Housing Act Amendments have been criticized by many
commentators. Massey and Denton present data indicating that
during the 1970s only 10% of the cases that HUD could not resolve
through conciliation were referred to the Justice Department for
possible prosecution."8 During the 1980s, according to Charles
histories creates factual issues for a determination of possible racial discrimination).
'7 See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 14, at 195-200 (describing how Congress
granted only limited enforcement authority, which in turn was poorly funded and
badly organized).
l73 See id. at 193. HUD's powers were limited to investigation and conciliation of
private complaints. HUD could also refer cases involving a "pattern or practice" of
discrimination to the Justice Department for possible prosecution. Id. at 196.
174 See id. at 198.
'" Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1623 (1988) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3608,
3610-3619, 3631 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
176 See 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a)(1)(A)(iii) (1988).
7 See § 36 10(g).
" See § 3612 (a)-(b).
171 See § 3612(o)(1).
"8 See § 3612(p) (administrative proceedings); § 3613(c)(2) (civil actions).
181 See § 3613(c)(1) (civil actions only).
182 See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 14, at 197.
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Lamb, the number of cases filed by the Justice Department declined
from an average of thirty-two per year to only ten. 183 More recently,
a 1994 report by the United States Commission on Civil Rights
criticized HUD and the Justice Department for insufficient resourc-
es allocated to Fair Housing enforcement, substantial backlogs and
lengthy delays in processing cases, and relatively few Secretary-
initiated investigations of discriminatory practices.8
Recent executive orders by President Clinton have suggested
that HUD, the Department of Justice, and the federal financial
regulatory agencies will increase their efforts to fight discrimination
among all participants in the housing market. The President has
ordered HUD to "issue regulations to define discriminatory
practices" and instructed both HUD and the Attorney General "to
aggressively enforce the laws prohibiting these practices." 185 HUD
has also agreed to streamline its complaint process, expand
investigation of the lending practices of mortgage companies,
inaugurate a testing program for mortgage originators in areas with
high minority rejection rates, and create at least a dozen fair
housing enforcement organizations in underserved areas of the
1'8 See Charles M. Lamb, Fair Housing Implementation from Nixon to Reagan 6-7
(Aug. 29, 1991) (unpublished paper, on file with authors). A further criticism voiced
by some commentators is the refusal by the justice Department during the 1980s to
prosecute fair housing cases using the disparate impact test. Because of the difficulty
of proving intent, most federal courts permit plaintiffs to bring an action under the
Fair Housing Act on the ground that a seemingly benign practice by an owner, real
estate agent, or landlord has a discriminatory effect on a protected group. See, e.g.,
Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 941-42 (2d Cir.)
(holding that the town violated the Fair Housing Act by refusing to amend an
ordinance that restricted private, multifamily housing projects to predominantly
minority urban renewal areas), afrd, 488 U.S. 15 (1988); Metropolitan Hous. Dev.
Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1285 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding
that, under the Fair Housing Act, the village was obligated to avoid zoning policies
that prevented the construction of low-cost housing within its boundaries), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1025 (1978); United States v. City of Blackjack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1183-84 (8th
Cir. 1974) (applying the Fair Housing Act to local government), cert. denied, 422 U.S.
1042 (1975). Once the plaintiffmeets its burden ofproving discriminatory effect, the
burden then shifts to the defendant to show that the practice is justified by business
necessity. If the defendant fails to meet this burden, the plaintiffsucceeds in proving
discrimination. Despite nearly unanimous judicial approval of the disparate impact
test by federal courts, the Reagan and Bush justice Departments took the position
that discriminatory intent must be shown to prove violations of the Fair Housing Act.
See U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE FAIR HOUSING AMENDMENTS ACT OF 1988:
THE ENFORCEMENT REPORT 196 (1994).
'8 See U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 183, at 221-22, 229.
1' Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 59 Fed.
Reg. 8513, 8515 (1994).
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country.18 In addition, the federal financial agencies charged with
examining the compliance of most financial institutions with federal
laws have issued regulations defining violations of federal anti-
discrimination laws18 7 and have committed themselves to increased
examination of patterns of loan acceptance and rejection and to
referral of possible violations to the Justice Department.
188
Social scientists, through the fair housing audit methodology,
have demonstrated beyond any doubt the existence of systemic
racial discrimination among home sellers and real estate agents in
the United States.8 9 Although the Boston Federal Reserve study
and some anecdotal reports and lawsuits suggest that race discrimi-
nation may also exist among home loan mortgage originators, the
evidence to date is not conclusive."' Additional research needs
to be undertaken to learn whether lending discrimination is
similarly widespread. To the extent that discrimination is found to
exist among participants in the housing market, increased enforce-
ment of the Fair Housing Act would be a useful tool to enable poor,
minority inner-city residents to attain housing outside of inner-city
neighborhoods.
B. Enhanced Housing Affordability in
Economically Integrated Areas
Vigorous enforcement of antidiscrimination laws will do little to
deconcentrate the inner-city poor if a sufficient supply of affordable
housing does not exist outside of the inner city. In many metropoli-
tan areas, particularly in the suburbs, local governments enact land
use regulations, such as zoning ordinances, impact fees, and growth
controls, that have the effect of limiting the supply of low-cost
housing and inflating prices. These ordinances may be motivated
18 See Annex to Performance Agreement Between the President of the United
States, WilliamJefferson Clinton, and the Secretary of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment, Henry G. Cisneros 1 4 (Mar. 18, 1994) (on file with authors).
187 See Policy Statement in Discrimination in Lending, 59 Fed. Reg. 18,266 (1994).
186 See Statement by Lawrence B. Lindsey, Member, Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, Before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs (Nov. 4, 1993) (on file with authors). HUD and the Department of
Justice have also committed themselves to using the disparate impact test in
prosecuting cases of housing discrimination. See HUD v. Mountain Side Mobile
Estates Partnership, 1993 WL 307069, at *5 (H.U.D.July 19, 1993) (stating that the
disparate impact test should be used to determine whether the Act has been violated);
U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 183, at 196.
189 See supra notes 163-64 and accompanying text.
' See supra notes 134-36 and accompanying text.
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by the desire to preserve environmental amenities, avoid overcrowd-
ing of public facilities, maintain socially and racially homogenous
communities, preserve property values, and avoid cross-subsidiza-
tion of lower income households.
19 '
Regardless of the motivation behind these local regulations,
empirical studies have demonstrated that they typically increase the
cost of housing. 92  Indeed, in some instances, communities
absolutely prohibit all types of housing that might be affordable to
low- and moderate-income households. If a substantial proportion
of the inner-city poor are to be enabled to move away from their
current neighborhoods, land-use barriers must be lowered so as to
permit the construction of low-cost housing. 93  The federal
government has, for the most part, avoided involving itself in issues
of local land use regulation. 94 Nevertheless, this reticence does
not necessarily mean that no federal role exists. Indeed, in 1991 a
federal commission, appointed by President Bush, recommended
that Congress reward states and localities that reduced regulatory
barriers and withhold federal housing and community development
funds from those that did not.'95 The bulk of the Commission's
1' Individuals can avoid cross-subsidizing others by forming homogenous
communities. See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64J. POL.
ECON. 416, 420-21 (1956). Zoning regulations can be used to set a minimum value
on property in a community to ensure that no one who lives in the jurisdiction pays
less in property taxes than her proportionate share of the cost of services provided,
thus avoiding cross-subsidization. See Bruce W. Hamilton, Zoning and Property
Taxation in a System of Local Governments, 12 URB. STUD. 205, 207 (1975) (creating a
theoretical model for the use of zoning and property tax).
12 The fact that land use regulations increase the cost of housing does not
necessarily imply that they are inefficient. For a summary of the literature discussing
the efficiency of land use regulations and demonstrating the effect of land use
regulations on housing prices, see WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, Do GROWTH CONTROLS
MATTER? A REVIEW OF EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON THE EFFECTIVENESS AND EFFICIENCY
OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAND USE REGULATION (1990); Henry 0. Pollakowski &
Susan M. Wachter, The Effects of Land-Use Constraints on Housing Prices, 66 LAND
ECON. 315 (1990); Schill & Wachter, supra note 165.
19 Professor Roisman notes that Fair Housing enforcement combined with shallow
subsidies in the suburbs may actually increase concentrated inner-city poverty because
only moderate-income families would be able to take advantage of them. See
Roisman, supra note 62, at 1374. Section 8 subsidies that subsidize individuals,
however, can be targeted to the very poorest households in a community and thus
avoid this "creaming" effect.
194 For brief histories of federal efforts to reduce exclusionary zoning practices in
the suburbs, see MICHAEL N. DANIELSON, THE POLITICS OF EXCLUSION 213-42 (1976);
Michael H. Schill, The Federal Role in ReducingRegulato7y Barriers to Affordable Housing
in the Suburbs, 8J.L. & POL. 703, 722-29 (1992).
195 See ADVISORY COMM'N ON REGULATORY BARRIERS TO AFFORDABLE HOuS., "NOT
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proposals, however, were never voted on by Congress.
Easing local regulations that increase the cost of new housing in
the suburbs would create an incentive for developers to construct
affordable housing. Even with relaxed land-use barriers, however,
most households currently living in neighborhoods of concentrated
inner-city poverty would probably still require government rental
assistance to afford the housing that would be constructed. At
present, the federal government provides two types of subsidies to
households renting in buildings owned by private landlords. The
Section 8 Existing Housing Certificate Program provides tenants
whose homes cost no more than the federally prescribed Fair
Market Rent (FMR) with a subsidy equal to the difference between
30% of their incomes and their rents. 9 6 The Section 8 Housing
Voucher Program operates somewhat differently. Instead of a
subsidy based upon actual rent, voucher recipients receive the
difference between 30% of their incomes and a hypothetical rent
based on the applicable FMR for their area.
197
The two Section 8 demand-oriented assistance programs avoid
many of the problems that plague supply-oriented housing subsidies
such as public housing.1 98 In theory, tenants can find housing in
neighborhoods that they prefer, rather than being forced into
neighborhoods of concentrated poverty. In practice, however,
demand-oriented subsidies have never realized their potential for
achieving the deconcentration of poor households. Empirical
studies of housing allowances and vouchers indicate that many
households remain in their current neighborhoods rather than move
elsewhere.' 99  The average increase in neighborhood median
income for those households that do move tends to be modest.
20 0
IN MY BACK YARD": REMOVING BARRIERS TO AFFORDABLE HOUSING 3-6 (1991).
" See 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(c) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).197 See 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Tenants under both Section
8 programs must find housing that meets minimum federal quality standards. See 24
C.F.R. § 882 (1994).
19s Housing vouchers and certificates are categorized as "demand-oriented"
subsidies because they directly stimulate demand, as opposed to "supply-oriented"
programs such as public housing, which subsidize producers of housing. For a
comparison of the effectiveness of demand- and supply-oriented subsidies in achieving
the objectives of housing policy, see Schill, supra note 28, at 526-40.
1 See Frieden, supra note 104, at 184 (stating that for blacks, "[e]ven many of
those who can afford to move to new housing in suburbia are blocked by discrimina-
tion or hostility and are forced to stay in central city ghettos");Jennifer L. Stucker,
Race and Residential Mobility: The Effects of Housing Assistance Programs on Household
Behavior, in HOUSING DESEGREGATION AND FEDERAL POLICY 253, 254 (John M.
Goering ed., 1986).2
00 See MIREILLE L. LEGER & STEPHEN D. KENNEDY, U.S. DEP'T OF HOuS. AND
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In addition, a relatively small proportion of recipients is unable to
locate suitable housing and must return their vouchers.
20 1
Increased enforcement of the Fair Housing Act and relaxed
regulatory barriers to affordable housing in the suburbs would
facilitate the ability of households to utilize housing vouchers and
certificates to leave neighborhoods of concentrated poverty. In
addition, changes in the Section 8 program itself might enhance its
effectiveness in achieving deconcentration. These changes would
improve the ability of Section 8 recipients to utilize vouchers
throughout their metropolitan areas.
In most instances, Section 8 tenant assistance programs are
administered by PHAs, which are typically geographically cotermi-
nous with municipalities. Therefore, within a metropolitan area,
dozens of PHAs may operate separate rent subsidy programs. In
1987, Congress passed legislation permitting Section 8 certificate
and voucher holders to utilize their rent subsidies outside the
jurisdiction that issued them.0 2 In 1992, however, at the urging
of PHAs, Congress restricted the portability of Section 8 subsidies
by requiring recipients who did not already live in the jurisdiction
of an issuing PHA to remain within that jurisdiction for at least
twelve months.2 3  The utility of Section 8 in promoting the
URBAN DEV., RECIPIENT HOUSING IN THE HOUSING VOUCHER AND CERTIFICATE
PROGRAMS 5 (1990) ("The average per capita income in tracts occupied by recipients
who moved was 4 percent higher than that in the tracts in which they had previously
lived."); Bernard J. Frieden, Housing Allowances: An Experiment That Worked, in
FEDERAL HOUSING POLICY AND PROGRAMS: PAST AND PRESENT 365, 375 (J. Paul
Mitchell ed., 1985) (finding a small tendency for households to move to somewhat
higher-income neighborhoods in the Experimental Housing Allowance Program
(EHAP));John C. Weicher, The Voucher/Production Debate, in BUILDING FOUNDATIONS:
HOUSING AND FEDERAL POLICY 263, 282 (Denise DiPasquale & Langley C. Keyes eds.,
1990) (finding that for those participants in EHAP who moved, the increase in
neighborhood income was small).
201 See STEPHEN D. KENNEDY, SECTION 8 RENTAL VOUCHER AND RENTAL CERTIFI-
CATE UTILIZATION STUDY at ii (1994) (finding that 87% of the national sample of
voucher and certificate recipients successfully obtained housing); Meryl Finkel &
Stephen D. Kennedy, Racial/Ethnic Differences in Utilization ofSection 8 Existing Rental
Vouchers and Certificates, 3 HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 463, 478 (1992) (listing an overall
success rate of 73% in 18jurisdictions, excluding New York City); Weicher, supra note
200, at 274 (reporting that 75% of the households in EHAP that expressed interest
were able to locate suitable housing).
202 See Housing and Community Development Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-242,
§ 145, 101 Stat. 1815, 1852 (1988) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(r) (1988)).
20- See Housing and Community Development Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-550,
§ 147, 106 Stat. 3672, 3715 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(r)(1) (Supp. V 1993)).
PHAs supported this amendment because of concerns that households would shop
among jurisdictions for the shortest waiting list.
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movement of poor households from inner cities to suburbs is also
limited by the ability of municipalities to grant preferences to their
own residents in obtaining assistance.
20 4
Congress could facilitate the mobility of households among
jurisdictions within a metropolitan area by eliminating all barriers
to Section 8 portability.2 5 One alternative would be to consoli-
date the administration of the Section 8 program at the metropoli-
tan level. Alternatively, all households receiving Section 8 assistance
could be permitted to use to their vouchers and certificates to locate
housing regardless of whether the housing is located within the
borders of the PHA that provided the assistance.
Although consolidating administration of the Section 8 program
at the metropolitan level might enhance mobility, current methods
of computing FMRs based upon median metropolitan rents inhibit
the ability of certificate and voucher holders to move to more
economically integrated surroundings. At present, FMRs are set at
the fortieth percentile of rents in a metropolitan area. In many
metropolitan areas, however, rents are much higher in the suburbs
than in central cities. 20 6  Basing FMRs on average metropolitan
rents ignores this diversity and geographically circumscribes the
areas in which Section 8 recipients can live. Altering the computa-
tion method for FMRs to decentralized geographic units such as
counties or PHAs would increase housing options for low-income
households in economically integrated communities.
20 7
214 See, e.g., Fayerweather v. Town of Narragansett Hous. Auth., 848 F. Supp. 19,
22 (D.R.I. 1994) (holding that preference to residents for Section 8 assistance does
not violate the right to interstate travel).
203 Restrictions on portability, however, might be justified if Section 8 subsidies
were to be used as a neighborhood redevelopment tool. In these instances, targeting
Section 8 to particular neighborhoods might, in combination with other initiatives to
renovate housing, ameliorate the public goods problem of uncoordinated investment.
For a discussion of the economic justification for housing assistance as opposed to
pure income redistribution, see Michael H. Schill, Privatizing Federal Low Income
Housing Assistance: The Case of Public Housing, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 878, 890-93
(1990).
206 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, RENTAL HOUSING: USE OF SMALLER
MARKET AREAS TO SET RENT SUBSIDY LEVELS HAS DRAWBACKS 49-50 (1994).
20 7 A recent study by the General Accounting Office examined the effect that
computing FMRs on a county-wide basis would have in increasing access of low-
income households to suburbanjurisdictions in metropolitan Washington, D.C. The
authors of the study estimate that under current metropolitan FMR calculation
methods, 73% of the housing in Washington, D.C. is available to Section 8 recipients,
whereas in suburban Montgomery and Fairfax counties the proportions are only 35%
and 23%, respectively. See id. at 32. County-wide calculation of FMRs would,
however, drive up the cost of the Section 8 program by increasing the level of
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To achieve Section 8's full potential in facilitating deconcentra-
tion of the inner-city poor, experience has shown that providing
information to tenants about communities outside their immediate
neighborhoods and assistance in locating available apartments can
be useful. One example of such a counselling program is the
Gautreaux Assisted Housing Program in Chicago. As a result of a
court decision that found HUD and the Chicago Housing Authority
liable for the racial segregation of Chicago public housing,20 8 over
6000 prospective public housing tenants have been given Section 8
certificates to rent homes in the suburbs. Under the Gautreaux
program, a nonprofit organization recruits landlords and provides
information and advice to tenants about locations with which they
might not otherwise be familiar. 211 Surveys of households partici-
pating in the program have found high levels of satisfaction among
tenants with both their housing and neighborhoods.
210
Finally, some evidence suggests that one of the reasons the
Section 8 program has not achieved substantial deconcentration is
that many landlords are reluctant to offer apartments to recipients
of the subsidies.211 Among the reasons for this reticence are the
rights that must be accorded to Section 8 tenants. When faced with
problem tenants, private landlords frequently choose not to
commence costly and time-consuming eviction proceedings prior to
the end of their lease terms, but instead refuse to renew the ten-
ants' leases. 212 Section 8 tenants, however, have the right to renew
subsidies and administrative costs. See id. at 37-46.
215 See Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 503 F.2d 930, 939 (7th Cir. 1974)
(concluding that, in order to remedy the effects of public housing discrimination,
HUD and CHA would have to include suburban areas surrounding Chicago in a
comprehensive desegregation plan), affid sub nom., Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284
(1976).29 See Mary Davis, The Gautreaux Assisted Housing Program, in HOUSING MARKETS
AND RESIDENTIAL MOBILITY 243, 245-47 (G. Thomas Kingsley & Margery A. Turner
eds., 1993) (describing how the Gautreaux program helps eligible families locate
housing).211 SeeJames E. Rosenbaum & SusanJ. Popkin, Economic and Social Impacts of
Housing Integration 21 (1990) (unpublished report to the Charles Stewart Mott
Foundation, on file with authors) (finding that suburban movers are more satisfied
with neighborhood safety, police protection, and schools than households that
remained in city).
211 See, e.g., MERYL FINKEL, ABT ASSOCIATES, INC., FINAL REPORT ON RECOMMENDA-
TIONS ON WAYS TO MAKE THE SECTION 8 PROGRAM MORE ACCEPTABLE IN THE
PRIVATE RENTAL MARKET 10-12 (1994); Thomas R. Shuler, Testimony Before the
House Comm. on Banking, Housing and Community Development on Housing
Assistance Payment Programs (Nov. 3, 1993) (on file with authors).
212 See FINKEL, supra note 211, at 11.
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their leases indefinitely unless they commit "serious or repeated
violation of the terms and conditions of the lease" or the landlord
can show "other good cause."2"' In addition, once a landlord
accepts one tenant with a Section 8 voucher or certificate, federal
law prohibits him or her from discriminating against future tenants
on the ground that they receive federal assistance.214 These rules,
designed to assist poor households in obtaining and holding onto
housing, may have the perverse effect of harming low-income
families by scaring away landlords and limiting the supply of
housing made available under the program.
215
C. Distressed Public Housing
For many of the inner-city poor, public housing is the problem
rather than the solution. Overwhelming concentrations of poor
households and half-abandoned buildings provide a hellish environ-
ment for residents.216 In addition, our analysis in Part II suggests
that public housing generates neighborhood effects that blight the
community in which it is located.21 7 This is especially true for the
nearly vacant, physically deteriorated projects that cannot be
213 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(d)(1)(B)(ii) (1988). "Other good cause," as further elabo-
rated by HUD regulations, may include disturbing neighbors, criminal activity, poor
housekeeping, and the owner's desire to use the unit for personal or family purposes.
See 24 C.F.R. § 882.215(c)(2) (1994).
214 See 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(t).
215 Before eliminating or modifying these legal protections, however, their costs
and benefits should be carefully analyzed. Although Section 8 landlords cannot
refuse to renew the leases of subsidized tenants who cause problems, it is unclear how
often landlords of unsubsidized tenants can cause their tenants to vacate merely by
failing to renew their leases. Under state law, tenants typically may be removed
against their will only by bringing an action in court for possession of the premises.
Furthermore, even if the protections tend to prevent landlords from offering their
apartments to Section 8 recipients, it is unclear what the appropriate legislative
response should be. For example, instead of eliminating the nondiscrimination rule
for landlords who rent to Section 8 tenants, some commentators have argued that the
rule should be extended to all private and public landlords. See Section 8 Housing
Assistance Payments Program: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Housing and Community
Development of the House Comm. on Banking Finance and Urban Affairs, 103d Cong., 1st
Sess. 48-49 (1993) (statement of David B. Bryson, Deputy Director, National Housing
Law Project).
2,6 See, e.g., ALEX KOTLOWITZ, THERE ARE No CHILDREN HERE: THE STORY OF
TWO BOYS GROWING UP IN THE OTHER AMERICA (1991) (describing the lives of two
children in Chicago's Henry Horner Homes); NICHOLAS LEMANN, THE PROMISED
LAND: THE GREAT BLACK MIGRATION AND HOW IT CHANGED AMERICA 225-31,295-97
(1991) (describing life in Chicago's Robert Taylor Homes).
211 See supra part II.A.2.
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demolished by PHAs because of Congress's one-for-one replacement
law.218 Relaxing the restrictiveness of the replacement rules would
not only improve inner-city neighborhoods, 21" but would also
promote deconcentration. If PHAs were able to replace demolished
public housing units by providing former tenants with housing
vouchers or certificates, not only would neighborhood eyesores and
nuisances be removed, but recipients of the housing subsidies would
be given the opportunity to locate housing outside of their current
neighborhoods.
With respect to existing public housing developments that are
not physically distressed and newly constructed developments,
Congress and PHAs can learn much from the past. Housing
policies that spatially concentrate poor people are bound to fail.
Government subsidy programs tied to particular developments can
avoid repeating the mistakes of the past by requiring mixed-income
tenant populations. 220  However, achieving economic mix in
subsidized housing developments requires legislation. Current
federal laws requiring over three-quarters of project-based subsi-
dized units to be rented to the very poor221 would need to be
amended. Furthermore, rules that currently provide incentives for
working families to leave public housing would have to be eliminat-
ed through the expansion and liberalization of ceiling rents.
Recent proposals by the Clinton Administration to make public
housing more responsive to the market2 22 may also have merit.
Under these plans, PHAs would no longer receive federal operating
218 See supra text accompanying notes 117-20.
211 Professor Roisman's speculation about our view on the one-for-one replace-
ment requirement is incorrect. See Roisman, supra note 62, at 1369-72. Rather than
requiring all PHAs to replace demolished public housing developments with newly
constructed public housing, we believe that any replacement housing that is statutorily
required should be subsidized through demand-oriented assistance.
22 For example, in Chicago, two public housing towers have been refurbished and
renamed Lake Parc Place. The Chicago Housing Authority obtained special legisla-
tion from Congress to lease half of the apartments in the development to households
earning between 50% and 80% of the area's median income. See Cranston-Gonzalez
National Affordable Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 101-625, § 522, 104 Stat. 4207, 4211
(1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (Supp. 111990 & Supp. V 1993)). New public
housing is also being constructed near the infamous Cabrini Green development,
which will also be leased to working-class families. For a discussion of Chicago's
mixed-income public housing, see Michael H. Schill, Chicago's Mixed Income New
Communities Strategy, in AFFORDABLE HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT IN THE U.S.:
LEARNING FROM FAILURE AND SUCCESS (Willem van Vliet ed., forthcoming 1995).
2' See Pub. L. No. 101-625, § 511, 104 Stat. at 4194 (1990).
See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF HOUS. AND URBAN DEV., HUD REINVENTION: FROM
BLUEPRINT TO ACTION 33-47 (1995).
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subsidies.22 Instead, all current tenants of public housing would
receive housing vouchers or certificates that could be used either
for their existing apartments or for housing owned by private
landlords. 2 4 High-performing PHAs would be able to retain
existing tenants, whereas those that are poorly managed or have
housing stocks that are substandard in terms of quality or location
would likely be forced either to improve their performance or
demolish surplus housing. Current proposals are somewhat unclear
as to whether PHAs will be able to lease their vacant units to
moderate-income, unsubsidized households. 25 To the extent that
PHAs are permitted this flexibility, "vouchering out" public housing
can be a useful tool to deconcentrate poverty by enabling very low-
income tenants to move elsewhere and by permitting PHAs to
attract more economically diverse tenants.22
CONCLUSION
Over a quarter century since the Kerner Commission warned
that America was "moving toward two societies, one black, one
white-separate and unequal,"22 the spiral of decline continues for
central cities. Large portions of American inner cities are now
home to an overwhelmingly poor, racially segregated, physically
isolated, and socially marginalized population. Crime, drug abuse,
school dropouts, teenage pregnancies, and intergenerational welfare
dependency create environments in which opportunities for social
mobility have all but disappeared.
In this Article, we have presented evidence to show that federal
housing laws and policies have contributed to the isolation and
concentration of poor people in inner-city communities. Sometimes
intentionally, perhaps more often unintentionally, this spatial bias
22S See id. at 41-43.
224 See id. at 42.
Compare id. at 39 (permitting PHAs to disregard certain income of tenants
during the transition period) with id. at 43 (requiring PHAs to follow low-income use
rules).
22 This is not to say that the transitional issues in transforming public housing will
not be daunting. In particular, to the extent that significant numbers of tenants leave
developments for housing owned by private landlords, downsizing public housing may
create difficult administrative and physical challenges for PHAs. Additional resources
might be needed to relocate tenants from half-vacant buildings and to demolish the
empty structures.
227 REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY CoMMIssIoN ON CIVIL DISORDERS 1
(1968).
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of housing law and policy continues to shape cities today. Impor-
tantly, however, it is not too late for the federal government to
implement legislation to ameliorate urban problems. The future of
America's cities and the people who live in them depend on it.
